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125 F.R.D. 578 (N.D.N.Y. 1989);

3.

Intern. Digital Systems v. Digital Equipment
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Mr. Geoff Butler
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These four cases are being submitted to the Court pursuant
to Rule 24(j) of the Rules of The Utah Supreme Court. They
should be considered in conjunction with Appellant's briefs
as a whole and, in particular, subsection III.
Very truly yours,
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Appellant
Gold Standard, Inc.

By:

v^ ™ *r ^^^^^0
Deno G. Himonas

dgh/cs
Encs.
cc:

Stephen G. Crockett, Esq.
Gordon L. Roberts, Esq.
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Doyle HARTMAN, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17094.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
Oct. 4, 1988.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 2, 1988.
Seller and producer of oil and gas
brought breach of contract action against
buyer and sought permanent injunction requiring buyer to abide by and perform its
obligations under contracts. The District
Court of Lea County, Larry Johnson, D.J.,
entered judgment on jury verdict in favor
"of producer and issued permanent injunction, and buyer appealed. The Supreme
Court, Sosa, Senior Justice, held that: (1)
neither Natural Gas Act nor Natural Gas
Policy Act precluded state court from deciding contractual issues involving gas purchase contracts which were regulated tangentially and peripherally by federal statutes; (2) striking buyer's affirmative defenses alleging applicability of force majeure clauses of contracts was not erroneous where clauses were used to force producer into submitting to buyer's scheme to
manipulate Oil Conservation Division's
mandate to producer as to how much gas
he could produce and to compel producer to
do business only on buyer's terms; (3) trial
court did not infringe on jurisdiction of Oil
Conservation Division in deciding that buyer manipulated Division's mandate to producer as to how much gas he could produce; and (4) buyer waived attorney-client
privilege to allegedly protected documents
by inadvertently producing documents.
Affirmed.
1. Gas <s=*13(l)
States <s=»18.15
Neither the Natural Gas Act nor the
Natural Gas Policy Act precluded state
court from deciding contractual issues in-

volving gas purchase contracts which were
regulated tangentially and peripherally by
federal statutes. Natural Gas Act, §§ 124, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 717-717w; Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978, §§ 2-602, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3301-3432; Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978, §§ 605-607, 15 U.S.
C.A. §§ 717x-717z.
2. Gas <3=»13U)
Force majeure clauses of gas purchase
contracts could not be used to force producer into submitting to buyer's scheme to
manipulate Oil Conservation Division's
mandate to producer as to how much gas
producer could produce, and to compel producer to do business only on buyer's terms,
where buyer had assumed risk of changing
market demands.
3. Mines and Minerals <s=*92.64
In breach of contract action brought
by producer of oil against buyer of oil and
gas, trial court did not infringe on jurisdiction of Oil Conservation Division when deciding, as part of contract action, that buyer manipulated Division's mandate to producer as to how much gas he could produce.
4. Witnesses e=>219(3)
Litigant waived attorney-client privilege to documents where litigant inadvertently produced documents to opponent.
5. Pretrial Procedure <s=»34
Witnesses <s=219(3)
In determining whether document has
lost its attorney-client privilege or workproduct immunity by inadvertent disclosure
to opponent, court should consider reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent
inadvertent disclosure in view of extent of
document production, number of inadvertent disclosures, extent of disclosure, delay
and measures taken to rectify disclosure,
and whether overriding interests of justice
would be served by relieving party of its
error.
6. Appeal and Error <s=»1043(6)
Order requiring production of additional documents after two documents allegedly subject to attorney-client privilege
were inadvertently produced was not preju-
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dicial to client where inadvertently produced documents were sufficient in and of
themselves to substantiate opponent's allegations concerning subject matter of those
documents.

Montgomery & Andrews, Gary R. Kilpatric, Joseph E. Earnest, W. Perry Pearce,
Sarah M. Singleton, Santa Fe, Andrews &
Kurth, Rush Moody, Jr., Atkhv Gump,
Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Randall L. Sarosdy,
Washington, D.C., Donald J. Maclver, Jr.,
James M. Gaitis, El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
El Paso, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
Atwood, Malone, Mann & Turner, Bob F.
Turner, Susan Zeller, Jeffery D. Tatum,
Roswell, Maddox, Renfrow & Saunders,
Don R. Maddox, Hobbs, J.E. Gallegos,
Campbell & Black, Michael B. Campbell,
Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.
OPINION
SOSA, Senior Justice.
PART ONE: PROCEDURAL CONTEXT
A. AMENDED COMPLAINT
On September 12, 1986, plaintiff-appellee,
Doyle Hartman (Hartman), filed his amended complaint against defendant-appellant,
El Paso Natural Gas Company (El Paso),
alleging that El Paso had intentionally and
maliciously breached various gas purchase
contracts entered into between Hartman as
seller-producer and El Paso as purchaserpipeline. Hartman also alleged certain tortious conduct, violations of the New Mexico
Antitrust Act, and sought a permanent injunction requiring El Paso to abide by and
perform its obligations under the buy-sell
contracts, to cease and desist from "shutting in" (closing down) certain of Hartman's wells, and requesting certain other
minor injunctive relief. For purposes of
this appeal, the relevant portions of Hartman's amended complaint are those allegations pertaining to breach of contract and
the two items of injunctive relief specified
above. Hartman sought both compensatory and punitive damages.

B. EL PASO'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
In addition to filing a general denial of
Hartman's claims, El Paso, on several occasions, filed certain affirmative defenses.
The most recently filed and only relevant
affirmative defenses, insofar as this appeal
is concerned, are as follows: (i) El Paso's
force majeure defense, in which it alleged
that it was excused from performance under the contracts at issue because "there
had been an unforseeable collapse of market demand in the middle portion of" the
1980's, coupled with new state and federal
regulations which substantially changed
the scope and thrust of the contracts at
issue; (ii) El Paso's commercial impracticability and frustration of purpose defenses,
in which it alleged that policies of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) "erode[d] the demand for higher
priced [i.e., Hartman's] gas produced under
contract to the [various gas] pipelines,"
thereby excusing its performance under
the contracts; (iii) that enforcement of the
contracts at issue would violate public policy, as determined by the State of New
Mexico's Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources Department, and the Oil Conservation Division thereof (OCD), thereby excusing El Paso from performance of the contracts at issue; (iv) that the entire substance of the contracts at issue was (a)
pre-empted by federal law and regulations
promulgated thereunder by FERC, and (b)
irreparably transformed to El Paso's detriment by regulations promulgated by
FERC, OCD, and the California Public Utilities Commission, thereby excusing El
Paso's performance under the contracts at
issue.
C. PRE-TRIAL ORDERS
The parties filed various pre-trial motions, the full extent of which is not relevant to this appeal. Certain orders, however, issued by the trial court in response
to these motions, constitute the core of El
Paso's appeal:
(i) the court's "Order Pursuant to Rule
56(d), N.M.R.Civ.P [sic]" (correctly cited as
SCRA 1986, 1-056(D)), 1986, which elimi-
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nated from the case, as a matter of law, a
major portion of El Paso's affirmative defenses, as to Jive of the natural gas contracts
(n) the court's "Partial Summary Judgment on the Oil Well Casmghead Contracts," issued on November 12, 1986,
which concluded that El Paso was "liable to
take all of the gas under the Oil Well
Casmghead Contracts l and to pay for such
gas at the contract price " (Emphasis added)
(in) the court's "Order Striking Defenses" issued December 2, 1986, which extended the above ruling to the remainder of the
contracts at issue Thus, by December 2,
1986, all of El Paso's affirmative defenses
as to all contracts at issue in this case
had, as a matter of law, been stricken,
(iv) the court's "Order Denying [El
Paso's] Motion for Reconsideration," issued
on October 1, 1986, which upheld the
court's earlier ruling that El Paso, in "inadvertently producing" certain documents
and giving these documents to Hartman's
counsel, waived its attorney-client privilege
as to those documents Further, by the
same order, the court ruled that El Paso
had also waived work-product immunity
"on the same subject matter," and thus
required El Paso to produce certain other
pertinent documents For reference infra,
these documents came to be numbered as
Hartman's exhibits, beginning with Number 124, the crucial "inadvertent document" triggering production of documents later numbered as exhibits 104,
120, 137, 146, 154, 206 and 207 The practical consequence of the court's order was
to require El Paso to produce confidential,

m-house information written by ,key El
Paso personnel during the period July 1,
1982 to June 18, 1986, a period when the
events complained of in Hartman's amended complaint were taking place

1. As will be developed in more detail later in
this opinion, there were thirty three contracts
governing the sale and purchase of casmghead
gas, and forty three contracts governing the sale
and purchase of gas produced from natural gas
wells
Casing-Head Gas is defined as 'Natu
ral gas from an oil well, saturated with oil
vapors or gasoline Black s Law Dictionary 273
(4th ed rev 1968) The gas produced from
natural gas wells, on the other hand, is com
monly termed 'dry gas

according to a complicated formula which is
not relevant to our determination of the issues
on appeal

2. The court allowed El Paso 'a credit against
dry gas takes from non marginal wells in pools
presently classified as prorated for the jury
award of $2 153 000 in compensatory damages '

D

TRIAL, JURY VERDICT AND JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT

Jury trial lasted from December 1 to
December 19, 1986 The jury found in
favor of Hartman and awarded him $2,153,000 in compensatory damages 2 and $1,080,000 in punitive damages The court entered judgment on the verdict on January
22, 1987, awarding post-judgment interest
on the combined damages at the rate of
fifteen percent
E

PERMANENT INJUNCTION
On March 24 1987, the court issued its
permanent injunction, issued thirty-five
findings of fact and ten conclusions of law,
and ruled, m pertinent part, as follows (I)
El Paso is required, as to the contracts
covering Hartman's dry gas wells, to take
Hartman's dry gas "in the maximum proportion of dehverabihty3 that gas is being
produced within the terms of the applicable
ratable take 4 provisions" of the contracts
involved, (n) El Paso is required, as to the
contracts covenng Hartman's castnghead
wells and gas wells in oil pools, to "take
and pay contract pnce for all gas produced
by casmghead wells and by gas wells in oil
pools, up to allowable limits5 for casing
head gas as defined" by certain regulations
of the OCD, (in) El Paso is required to
"exercise good faith in the manner in which

3.

As to the concept of maximum proportion of
dehverabihty,' see generally, NMSA 1978,
§§ 70-2-1 to -38, known as the 'Oil and Gas
Act,* and in particular § 70-2-16(C)

4

As to the concept of 'ratable take,' see the
balance of this opinion, infra

5. As to the concept of 'allowable limits,' see
NMSA 1978, § 70-2-16(C)

it performs" the requirements mandated by
the permanent injunction
F

ISSUES RAISED BY EL PASO ON
APPEAL
On appeal, El Paso contends (I) that the
trial court's jurisdiction to decide this case
was pre-empted by federal law, (n) that
genuine issues of material fact existed as
to the stricken affirmative defenses, (in)
that the OCD's jurisdiction pre-empted that
of the trial court as to "nominations and
allowables," * and (iv) that the trial court
abused its discretion m ruling against El
Paso as to the documents which El Paso
alleged were protected from discovery by
attorney client privilege and work product
immunity Accordingly, EI Paso asks us to
reverse and vacate the jury verdict and
judgment thereon and quash the permanent injunction, or in the alternative, to
vacate the judgment and remand the cause
for a new trial in which El Paso is permit
ted "to introduce evidence substantiating
its affirmative defenses,' and in which "the
jury not be permitted to hear evidence or
arguments concerning the privileged or immune documents at issue "
G

OUR HOLDING ON APPEAL
We reject each of El Paso's contentions
on appeal, affirm the trial court's judgment
on the jury verdict, and order El Paso to
abide by and honor, in good faith and in
detail, the trial court's permanent injunction
PART TWO FACTS
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
El Paso is a natural gas transporting and
sales company, whose pipelines intersect
the Permian Basin in Texas and New Mexico, the Anadarko Basin m Oklahoma, and
the San Juan Basin m New Mexico On
appeal, the relevant pools of natural gas
involved are the Eumont Pool and the Jalmat Pool, both located in southeastern New
Mexico Hartman is a producer of natural
gas, and operates wells which pump gas
from the Eumont and Jalmat pools Most
A

6. See id.

N M
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of Hartman's wells lie in Lea and Eddy
counties, New Mexico Hartman operates
some 95 dry gas wells on acreage dedicated
to El Paso under the contracts at issue El
Paso's pipeline runs in roughly a north by
northwest direction through the Jalmat and
Eumont pools, which are located south to
southwest of Hobbs, New Mexico
For some reason, neither party on appeal
has chosen to state when their contractual
relationship began From the record, however, we can glean enough information to
conclude that well before 1982 the parties
had been enjoying a mutually satisfactory
and profitable relationship
Our opinion would be too exhaustive to
read if we were to quote extensively from
all of the documents produced before and
during trial Thus, we shall quote only
from the "triggering memo," relevant to
the lower court's order of October 1, 1986,
Exhibit 124, written to an El Paso executive by El Paso's m house attorney, on May
24, 1984 Before summarizing relevant
statutes in Oklahoma, Texas and New Mexico, the attorney states the purpobe of his
memo to be "the extent of El Pasof's]
* * * obligation to take ratably across its
system and the extent of El Paso's ability
to take more gas from less expensive systems This memorandum sets forth my
conclusions ' The attorney's conclusions
were as follows
There are, however, certain risks to
adopting such a limited least cost production scheduling policy While El Paso
could continue to raise the argument
that, since it is complying with the letter
of all applicable ratable take statutes, it
is excused from prepayment obligations
under take-or-pay contracts, a great deal
of the persuasive force behind El Paso's
position would have been lost Producers which formerly were convinced not to
press prepayment claims, because of
their belief that El Paso was being fair
and evenhanded, would likely file lawsuits claiming prepayments Such suits
could cover not only the current year but
any past year in which El Paso's takes,
though ratable across its system, were
less than the contractual minimum Be-
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cause of the tendency to settle lawsuits
rather than litigate, especially where the
defenses are untested and questionable,
a flood of lawsuits would doubtless result in a large amount of negotiated prepayments This, of course, would lead to
higher resale prices and possible lower
sales, thereby aggravating El Paso's deliverabihty surplus and prepayment problem
This memo inspired El Paso's decision
makers to formulate its "least-cost production" strategy, as spelled out in other disputed documents, and m its May 1986
"Strategic Plan " This plan had already
been outlined to producers, including Hartman, in El Paso's "Notice to Sellers," dated
February 28, 1986 In that notice, El Paso
advised Hartman
El Paso intends to modify its productionscheduling procedures in a manner that
maximizes, to the extent practicable and
legally permissible, the purchases of gas
from El Paso's lowest cost sources of
supply
*
*
*
*
*
*
El Paso must take immediate action to
reduce its sales rates

Since the allowable limits which the OCD
established in its rules and regulations
were to a large degree determined by previous purchasing patterns, the OCD's setting of allowables for Hartman's wells was
based largely on EI Paso's own purchasing
volume To that extent, the court found
that El Paso manipulated the OCD's mandate to Hartman as to how much gas he
could produce As El Paso reduced its
purchases from the Jalmat and Eumont
Pools, for example, the OCD's determination of Hartman's allowables would decrease commensurately On April 21, 1986,
El Paso wrote to Hartman and other producers, announcing, "El Paso hereby proposes to release you from your commitment, under applicable contracts * * * "

In his amended complaint, Hartman alleged that beginning January 1, 1985, El
Paso "unilaterally reduced the price paid
for dry gas actually taken from certain of
[his] wells," and that beginning June 1,
1986, "El Paso has unilaterally reduced the
price paid for oil well casinghead gas and
gas well casinghead gas taken under the
Contracts " The trial court found that El
Paso's actions were "in wanton disregard
of [Hartman's] contractual rights "
* * * * * *
El Paso's net worth in 1985 was $1,069,If El Paso's pnce becomes noncompetitive * * * with other gas supplies or with 258,000, while m 1986 its net worth had
alternative fuels, El Paso may be forced increased to $1,140,300,000 Hartman filed
to take more drastic price actions or to his original complaint on April 8, 1986, folmake further modification to its produc- lowing El Paso's "shutting in" (closing
tion-scheduling procedures
We will down) of some eighty-five of his wells
strive to keep you informed if such ac- These wells remained shut in until the
tions become necessary
court issued its permanent injunction
The trial court found that El Paso ignored the ratable take provisions of its B NATURE OF THE CONTRACTS
BREACHED
contracts with Hartman, and instead faThe contracts involved here are varied,
vored its own affiliates, notably "Meridian," and "Southland Royalty," m purchas- complex and lengthy We shall speak of
es of gas The jury found that El Paso four vaneties of contracts containing rata"nominated" or predicted m bad faith how ble take clauses These contracts cover
much of Hartman's allowable production it both Hartman's prorated gas, that is, gas
would take El Paso had created El Paso covered by the "allowable" system defined
Gas Marketing Company to enter into and in NMSA 1978, Section 70-2-16, and perticompete with other purchasers on the spot nent OCD regulations, as well as his nonmarket, and to submit joint nominations prorated gas Generally speaking, the
with El Paso for purchasable gas The four varieties of ratable take contracts rerecord shows that El Paso and El Paso Gas quire that El Paso purchase gas from the
Marketing Company were essentially inter- prorated pools in some stated pro-rata porchangeable names for the same entity
tion of Hartman's allowable limit of pro-

duction, and at full dehverabihty for his
non-prorated wells. There is, in addition,
a type of contract clause designated by the
parties as a "Type 5 Ratable Take Clause,"
which in actuality simply restates El Paso's
obligation to purchase gas under all contracts up to allowable limits
In addition to this classification system,
the parties by stipulation classified the contracts according to "Wells for Which Damages Have Been Claimed For Alleged NonRatable Taking" (81 of such weHs), "Wells
for Which Price Claims Have Been Made"
(32 of such wells), and "Wells on Which No
Damages Have Been Claimed" (38 of such
wells) With reference to the first two
catagones of wells discussed in this paragraph, there is overlap, in that some wells
fall into both categories, while wells in the
third category discussed in this paragraph
are covered by the permanent injunction
but were not wells for which contract damages were claimed
The trial court based its conclusion of
irreparable damage to Hartman largely on
the fact that ninety two percent of Hartman s gas production is subject to his contracts with El Paso, and that ninety five
percent of his income is derived from his
Lea County production The trial court
found, based on the record as we have
summarized it, that "[b]ecause of [El
Paso's] ongoing breach of its contracts
with [Hartman], [Hartman] will continue to
suffer a substantial loss of revenue, inhibiting his present and future ability to explore
for, produce and sell natural gas "
PART THREE LEGAL ISSUES
RAISED ON APPEAL
A WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S JURISDICTION PRE-EMPTED BY FEDER
AL LAW? OUR DECISION NO
[1] El Paso argues for an affirmative
answer to this question by citing several
Supreme Court and federal cases which are
inapposite The pnncipal error El Paso
makes is to confuse cases involving pipelines versus consumers, on the one hand,
and state regulatory agencies' decisions
versus federal statutory authonty, on the
other The present appeal involves neither
7.

15 U S C §§ 717 to -717z (1982) and 15 U S C

144 (NM

N M
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of these issues It is a contract case, and
neither the Natural Gas Act (NGA) nor the
Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA)7 precludes
a state court from deciding issues involving
oil and gas contracts which are regulated
tangentially and peripherally, insofar as
the legal issues herein are concerned
Thus, contrary to what El Paso argues,
Northern Natural Gas Co v State Corp
Commission of Kansas, 372 U S 84, 83
SCt 646, 9 LEd2d 601 (1963), did not
prohibit the trial court here from asserting
jurisdiction In that case the principal contract at issue was not before the Supreme
Court on appeal Further, the producer of
natural gas was not a party to the suit
Northern Natural Gas Co involved a
state agency's entanglement in federal affairs The case before us involves the issue of a private party attempting to enforce a private contract against a corporation
Likewise, Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corp v State Oil and Gas
Board of Mississippi, 474 U S 409, 106
S Ct 709, 88 L Ed 2d 732 (1986), relied on
by El Paso, is not on point In that case,
the issue was similar to the issue raised in
Northern Further, the Court in Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp explicitly
distinguished between FERC's jurisdiction
and the role which free market forces must
play in oil and gas contracts such as the
one before us
To the extent that Congress denied
FERC the power to regulate affirmatively particular aspects of the first sale of
gas, it did so because it wanted to leave
determination of supply and first-sale
pnce to the market
Id at 422, 106 S Ct at 717
In actuality, the issue which El Paso
raises as to federal pre-emption versus
freedom of contract has long been settled
"Neither the NGPA nor the NGA expressly
preempt the application of state contract
law to the interpretation of gas purchase
contracts" Pennzoil Co v FERC, 645
F 2d 360, 384 (5th Cir 1981), see also Tenneco Oil Co v El Paso Natural Gas, 687
P 2d 1049 (Okla 1984), and International
Minerals & Chem Corp v Llano, 770
F 2d 879 (10th Cir 1985) cert denied, 475
§§ 3301 to -3432 (1982). respectively

1150
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U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1196, 89 L.Ed.2d 310
(1986) (presumption of freedom of contract
under state law without interference either
by FERC's regulations or restraints imposed by the NGA or the NGPA). Cf
Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824
F.2d 981, 1025-26 (D.C.Cir.i987), cert, denied, — U.S.
, 108 S.Ct. 1468, 99
L.Ed.2d 698 (1988) (where, although the
court disagreed with FERC's reasoning as
to issuance of its Order No. 436,* it did
nothing to limit the private contract prerogatives of either pipelines or producers).
As we held in Ashlock v. Sunwest
Bank
of Roswell, 107 N.M. 100, 103, 753 P.2d
346, 349 (1988), so too here, we hold that
state (contract) law and federal regulation
are not in conflict, and *rus there is no
pre-emption by any applicable federal statute,
B.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN
STRIKING EL PASO'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES? OUR DECISION:
NO.

As to this issue, we agree with the reasoning employed by the court in granting
summary judgment in Thomas N Berry £
Co. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., No.
CIV-85-1430-R (W.D.Okla. May 15, 1986):
[T]he defendant seems to labor under the
misconception that it is the plaintiffs
burden not only to prove its prima facie
case, * * * but also to prove that the
defendant has no affirmative defenses.
Consequently, as the defendant has
failed to submit any credible evidence to
show issues of material fact exist as to
[its] defenses, summary judgment will be
granted to them * * *.
El Paso is right to argue on appeal that
"[sjummary judgment is a drastic remedy
to be used with great caution."
Pharmaseal Laboratories, Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M
753, 756, 568 P.2d 589, 592 (1977). H*-->
however, the court cautiously and pru
ly applied the drastic remedy that
needed.
8. For Order No. 436, see 50 Fed.Reg. 42.408
(1985). In this case FERC's order was vacated
and remanded for further proceedings because
FERC inadequately addressed itself to "take-orpay" problems raised by the issues before it.
Footnote 25 of the decision, however, notes, "No

Trial courts have consistently f struck
down defenses which have no basis in either fact or law, as was the case here. See
International
Minerals & Chem. Corp.,
holding in a natural gas seller's favor on
the issue of a force majeure clause, where
a buyer complied with a regulation of the
New Mexico Environmental Improvement
Board requiring the seller to shut down
certain parts of its potash processing facility near Carlsbad. The buyer unsuccessfully sought a declaratory judgment in the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, asking to be excused
from its performance under the contract
with the seller because of the force majeure clause. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with
the trial court on the issue of force majeure, but reversed the trial court's decision
because "there was no technically suitable
way for [the plaintiff] to comply with [the
state's regulation] without shutting
down
* * * " its operation. 770 F.2d at 887 (emphasis added). In the case before us, the
shoe is on the other foot. It is Hartman
who is being "shut down," not El Paso, and
by El Paso's actions.
[2] The force majeure clauses of the
pertinent contracts before us may not be
sanctioned when used to force a producer
into submitting to a seller's scheme and
compel him to do business only on the
seller's terms, as was the case here. The
Supreme Court has taken a similar approach in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v,
Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
103 S.Ct. 697, 74 L.Ed.2d 569 (1983), wherein it held that a Kansas statute regulating
the price of natural gas in a buy-sell agreement entered into between a Kansas public
utility and an energy company did not void
the parties' contractual obligations. See
also Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S.
176, 103 S.Ct. 2296, 76 L.Ed.2d 497 (1983).
As the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has ruled:
party here presents any argument for a view
that FERC could exercise its § 5 power to modify nonjurisdictional wellhead contracts," Associated Gas Distributors at 1022. The contracts
at issue in the case before us are purely and
simply "nonjurisdictional wellhead contracts."

HARTMAN v. EL PASO NATURAL GAS CO,

N.M. 1151

Cite • • 7 6 3 P.2d 1144 (N.M. 1988)

Since impossibility and related doctrines
are devices for shifting risk in accordance with the parties' presumed intentions, which are to minimize the costs of
contract performance, one of which is the
disutility created by risk, they have no
place when the contract explicitly assigns
a particular risk to one party or the
other.
Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 278
(7th Cir.1986). We likewise agree with the
court in Resources Investment
Corp. v.
Enron
Corp., 669 F.Supp. 1038, 1043
(D.Colo. 1987), when it ruled:
[T]he parties clearly contemplated the
likelihood of changing economic conditions, including alterations in fuel price
levels "and such fluctuation was not the
kind of completely unforeseeable event
required to invoke the doctrine of frustration of purpose," [United States of
America v. Great Plains
Gasification
Associates, et aL, 819 F.2d 831 (8th Cir.
1987)] at p. 835. "This court will not
hold a contract to be frustrated merely
because of an increase in cost to one of
the parties." Ross Industries v. M/V
Gretke Oldendorff
483 F.Supp. 195,
199-200 (E.D.Tex.1980).... Similar considerations govern the claim based upon
impossibility and commercial impracticability.
In the case before us, the affirmative
defenses were devoid of any real contact
with the facts, and the trial court prudently
struck them from the case. If there was
any risk to be assumed, it was El Paso
which assumed it.
C.

DID THE TRIAL COURT LACK SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN
MAKING FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS AS TO CERTAIN MATTERS
INVOLVING OCD REGULATIONS?
OUR DECISION: NO.
[3] In its brief-in-chief, El Paso claimed
the trial court "committed fundamental error by intruding into an area within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the New Mexico
OCD. This occurred when the court considered Hartman's claim that the process
established by the OCD for setting allow-

ables under its proration scheme is no longer effective, when it adjudicated the reliability of the OCD system of nominations
and allowables, and when it altered subsequent allowables without taking into account any of the factors required by statute or OCD regulations to be considered in
setting allowables in order to conserve natural resources and prevent waste." The
problem with this contention is that the
trial court did none of the things of which
El Paso accuses it. The trial court never
ruled that OCD's system "is no longer effective." Nor did the trial court take any
action to "adjudicate the reliability of the
OCD system." Finally, it was El Paso, and
not the trial court, which "altered allowables" through its manipulation of the market.
We take El Paso's contention on this
issue to be a variety of the public rights vs.
private rights argument resolved by the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Tenneco
Oil Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. Quoting from Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct.
2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982), the court stated:
[I]t suffices to observe that a matter of
public rights must at a minimum
arise
"between the government and others."
In contrast, lithe liability of one individual to another under the law as defined, " is a matter of private
rights
* * *. Private-rights disputes m * * lie
at the core of the historically
recognized judicial
power.
687 P.2d at 1053-1054 (emphasis in original).
The case before us is not one involving
"the government and others." It is a contract case, involving a private individual
and a corporation. The trial court did not
infringe on the jurisdiction of the OCD.
D.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN
RULING THAT EL PASO HAD
WAIVED
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT
IMMUNITY INSOFAR AS THE DISPUTED DOCUMENTS ARE CONCERNED? OUR DECISION: NO.
[4] This is an issue of first impression
in New Mexico. We take as our starting
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point the principle stated by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit: "It is axiomatic that the burden is
on a party claiming the protection of a
privilege to establish those facts that are
the essential elements of the privileged relationship." von Bulow by Auersperg v.
;->n Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2nd Cir.),
crrt denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891,
95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987).
El Paso argues its point by way of analogy to contract law, asserting the equitable
defense of mistake of fact, in that it inadvertently produced two of the allegedly
protected documents before the court ordered it to produce the others. See Albuquerque Nat'l Bank
v.
Albuquerque
Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 654 P.2d
548 (1982); Talley v. Sec. Serv. Corp., 99
N.M. 702, 663 P.2d 361 (1983). El Paso
bases its argument in favor of a rule supporting its position on a case that is frequently cited as foundational on this issue,
Mendenhall
v. Barber-Greene
Co., 531
F.Supp. 951 (N.D.I11.1982), where the court
held that counsel's inadvertent productior
of privileged letters to its adversary in a
patent infringement action did not consti
tute waiver of the attorney-client privilege
We disagree with El Paso that the rule ir
Mendenhall v Barber-Greene
Co. shoulc
be the New Mexico rule governing this
issue. Instead, we favor the approach tak
en by the court in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323 (N.D.
Cal.1985). There the court spoke of the
rule in Mendenhall as being of weak precedential value and not the majority rule. Id.
at 329. Our study of this issue persuade^
us that the court in Hartford Fire Insur
ance Co. v. Garvey was right in its assessment;
"Phe modern trend seems to be towards
a case by case determination of waiver
jased on a consideration of all circumstances. The majority of cases do hold
or take for granted, that inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents may
waive the privilege. * * * The "inadvertence" of the production is considered

as one factor in determining vr*»ththere has been a waiver.
Id. at 329-30 (citations omitted).
The court in Parkway Gallery
Furn
hire,
Inc. v.
Kittinger/Pennsylvania
House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46 (M.D N
C.1987), while not extending the waiver oi
privilege to documents not already inadvertently produced, descnbed the general
principle behind the modern trend, as follows:
Notwithstanding its ancient roots and
modern necessity, the [attorney-client]
privilege must be strictly construed to
ensure that it does not unduly impinge
Oil the more general, overriding duty of
insisting that investigations and decisions be based on truth and reality as
opposed to fiction or fabrication.
T
d at 49 (citation omitted).
[5] The court then listed fiv t factors
-hieh should assist a court in determining
-nether a document has lost its privilege
(1) The reasonableness of the precau
tions taken to prevent inadvertent disclc^
sure in view of the extent of the document production; (2) the number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of
the disclosure; (4) any delay and measures taken to rectify the disclosures; (5)
whether the overriding interests of justice would be served by relieving a part^
of its error.
d. at 50.
When measuring El Paso's conduct by
these factors, we find its conduct lacking.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in ordering El Paso
to produce the documents.
[6] The above criteria pertain both to
the trial court's determination of the issue
of attorney-client privilege as well as to its
determination of the issue of work-product
immunity. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 109
F.R.D. at 327. As for the additional documents ordered to be produced, we conclude that the two inadvertently produced
documents were sufficient in and of themselves to substantiate Hartman's allegations concerning the subject matter of
those documents. Hence, since the cat was

already out of the bag, as far as the jury's
- z - , e d g e of El Paso's conduct is con-r-. e c z was not prejudicial to El Paso's
*= rial court to order production
- -r_
--u.nnal documents,
PART FOUR. CONCLU8! r, N 4ND
SUMMARY OF OUR HOLDING
ON APPEAL
To summarize, we affirm the trial court s
udgment on the verdict, and order PI Paso
*o comply strictly, in detail and in good
-aith, with the trial court's permanent induction,
IT IS SO ORDERED
SCARBOROUGH «\STOWEES, J., concur

-
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Gayle D. RICHARDSON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Wade
Fitzsimmons Richardson, Deceased, PeT
itioner,
v.
C

Z IE LIBRARY RESTAURANT,
z b ' a The Country Connection,
a n c ---nnett-Cathey, Inc., Respondents.
No. 17432.
Supr-—- Court of New Mexico
Oct. 18, 1988,
Reheanngs Denied Nov, 21 1988.

Personal representative of decedent
killed in automobile-dump truck accident
brought suit against dramshop operator
who served alcohol to driver of stolen
dump truck and owner of dump truck. The
District Court, Harvey W. Fort, D.J., granted summary judgment to dump truck owner and limited dramshop's liability to cap in
statr*
The Court of Appeals affirmed in
an J
blished decision. On certiorari, the
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Supreme Court, Walters, J , held that: (1)
intermediate or heightened scrutiny test
applied to equal protection challenge to cap
in statute; (2) cap in dramshop statute was
unconstitutional; and (3) a majority of the
court was unable to reach agreement on
whether dump truck owner was liable for
negligence
R e v e r s e - - a r t ana ^ - - - a m . - .
Ranso—
opinion.
Stowe^

I^:J

^rred

n

~ n—e—**1 Mth opinio

1, Amicus Curiae ^=3
Plaintiffs statement at trial that damage cap in Dramshop Act violated State
Constitution was insufficient to preserve
issues of separation of powers or state due
process on appeal through amicus briefs.
2. Amicus Curiae e=»3
Plaintiffs failure to demand a jury tna m timely manner waived amicus curiae
aoility to brief on how dramshop damage
recovery cap violated state right to jury
trial. SCRA 1986, Rule 1-038, subd. D.
3 Constitutional Law «=245(3)
Claim of tort victims affected by damape cap in dramshop liability act was at
least sensitive enough to injustice wrought
to warrant application of intermediate or
heightened scrutiny test in state equal protection challenge to the cap. Cons- Art. 2,
§ 4; NMSA 1978, §§ 41-11-1 ^ =11-1,
subd. I.
4, Constitutional Law ®=*209
Test for reviewing equal protection
challenges are generally the same under
New Mexico and federal law; minimum
scrutiny also known as rational basis test,
strict scrutiny, and intermediate or heightened scrutiny. Const. Art. 2, § 18; U.S.C.
A. Const.Amend. 14.
5, Constitutional Law <s=>48(l)
Legislative acts are presumptively vaia and normally are subject to rational ba
sis test, and will not be declared invalic
unless court is clearly satisfied that legisla
ture went outside Constitution in enacting
them.

rs
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g to have an otherwise valid judgment
clared void, but is merely asking for recpnition of the fact that the previous judgent is a legal nullity. Venue, on the
her hand, is simply a privilege extended
each defendant, and is deemed to be
fcived unless a timely objection is interred. 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice,
).146[6] (2d ed. 1988). Defendant Lepore
d not question venue during the pendency
k
the federal action and, indeed, has yet to
terpose any objection to venue being laid
the district of Arizona. Accordingly,
lere is no basis for finding that the federdefault judgment is void or that the
>rtions of the action subjudice that relate
) that judgment should be dismissed. The
efendant's motion should therefore be deled.7

1

de nt doubt ' on the validity of plaintiffs
claims to impugn the prejudgment attachment However, since a defendant will ordinarily move pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat
§ 52-278e for a hearing to vacate a prejudgment remedy, and since the defendant
has called into question an affidavit submitted by plaintiffs in support of the attachment, the pending motion should be
denied without prejudice to the defendant's
filing a timely motion for a hearing in strict
accordance with the above-referenced statute.
V.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the
defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is denied in all respects.
The motion to vacate the prejudgment attachment is denied without prejudice to to
the filing of a renewed motion to vacate
and a request for a hearing as contemplated by Conn.Gen.Stat § 52-278e.

IV.
[61 Counts Two through Six of the
resent complaint involve the allegedly
raudulent conveyance of real property
rom defendant Lepore to the corporate
efendant, Ultra Service, Inc. Pursuant to
federal Rule 64 md Conn.Gen.Stat
52-278c(aXl), plaintiffs application for a
>rejudgment attachment on the two properies was granted on the basis of a finding NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION; Long Island Lighting Com>f probable cause supporting the plaintiffs
pany; New York State Electric & Gas
:laims. See Order (Jan. 6, 1989). DefenCorporation; Rochester Gas and Eleclant Lepore has now moved to vacate the
tric Corporation; and Central Hudson
ittachments on the grounds that there is
Gas & Electric Corporation, Plaintiffs,
'sufficient doubt" that plaintiffs will be
v.
ible to establish that the conveyance were
nade with a fraudulent intent as required STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING
Dy Conn.Gen.Stat § 52-552.
CORPORATION, ITT Fluid Products
Corporation, and ITT Fluid Technology
A prejudgment remedy may be obtained
Corporation, Defendants.
when the plaintiff establishes that there is
probable cause to sustain the validity of his
No. 88-CV-819.
claims. The plaintiff need not demonUnited
States District Court,
strate, by a preponderance of evidence or
N.D. New York.
otherwise, that he will prevail. Dow &
May 25, 1989.
Condon, Inc. v. Anderson, 203 Conn. 475,
525 A.2d 935 (1987). Contrary to defendant's assertions, the affidavit submitted in
, Nuclear power plant owners brought
support of his motion does not cast "suffl- action against construction manager and
7. Defendant Lepore is similarly not entitled to
summary judgment at the present time. As the
foregoing makes clear, there are still genuine
issues of material fact regarding the nature and
extent of Mr. Lepore's involvement in the partnership transactions. Until these are conclu-

sively resolved, the court cannot find, as a matter of law, that the judgments at issue were
placed on an unsound jurisdictional foundation.
Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary
judgment should also be denied.

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER v. STONE & WEBSTER ENG.
Cite M US FJLD. S7S (MJKN.Y. 19tf)

Held fabrication and piping contractors to
recover for faulty design and construction
of plant One owner and manager moved
for protective orders, and contractors
moved to compel production of documents.
The District Court, McCurn, Chief Judge,
held that (1) documents submitted in proceeding before New York Public Service
Commission were work product; (2) owners
waived work product protection as to some
of those documents; and (3) manager was
not entitled to depose owners' attorney.
Motions granted in part and denied in
part
1. Federal Civil Procedure ^» 1600.2
Protected work product contained in
documents and tangible things cannot be
obtained through less tangible methods
such as deposition questioning of persons
with knowledge of protected information.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.
A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure «= 1600.2
Work product documents prepared for
litigation in one action are protected from
discovery in subsequent, related suit Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure «=»1600.2
Nuclear power plant's construction
manager that provided architectural and
engineering services and consultants were
"representatives" of owners of nuclear
power plant within meaning of work product rule; manager and consultants prepared or reviewed documents at direction
of owners or their attorneys in anticipation
of litigation before New York Public Service Commission. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Federal Civil Procedure «=M 600.2
Documents prepared at direction of nuclear power plant owners or their attorneys
in anticipation of litigation before New
York Public Service Commission to determine prudence of costs for power plant
were work product in suit by owners to
recover for allegedly faulty design and con-
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struction of plant by field fabrication and
piping contractors and construction manager which also served as architectural and
engineering firm; suit by owners was
closely related to prudence proceeding before Commission. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A.
5. Federal Civil Procedure *»1600.4
Generally, work product protection is
waived when documents are voluntarily
shared with adversary or when party possessing documents seeks to selectively
present materials to prove a point, but then
attempts to invoke privilege to prevent opponent from challenging assertion. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A.
6. Federal Civil Procedure *= 1600.4
Sharing work product material with
friendly party does not waive work product
protection as it applies to adverse third
party. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(bX3), 28
U.S.C.A.
7. Federal Civil Procedure *=»1600.4
Protection of work product materials is
not waived when disclosure occurs through
excusable inadvertence. Fed.Rules Civ.
ProcRule 26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A.
8. Federal Civil Procedure «=*1600.4
Knowing release of privileged documents constitutes waiver of work product
protection and is not inadvertent, while
simple mistake that is immediately recognized and rectified is not waiver of work
product protection. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
Rule 26(bX3), 28 U.S.C.A.
9. Federal Civil Procedure *= 1600.4
Generally, work product protection is
waived when protected materials are disclosed in manner which is either inconsistent with maintaining secrecy against opponents or substantially increases opportunity for potential adversary to obtain protected information. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
26(bX3), 28 U.S.OA.
10. Federal Civil Procedure «=M 600.4
Owners of nuclear power plant in action against construction manager and field
fabrication and piping contractors to recover for allegedly faulty design and construe-

so

125 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS

>n waived work product protection with
spect to "Product Management Book"
hich was written by manager over course
many years before New York Public
jrvice Commission initiated proceeding to
itermine prudence of costs of power
ant; manager, which also served as archict and engineer, did not obtain possession
r excusable inadvertence or compulsion;
id owners were apparently cognizant of
itential for adversary legal relationship
ith manager and could have created
took" without manager's assistance.
jd.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26<bX3), 28 U.S.
A.
. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1600.4
Owners of nuclear power plant in aero against construction manager and field
brication and piping contractors to recovfor allegedly faulty design and eonstruc>n did not waive work product protection
ith respect to draft answers to interrogat e s by New York Public Service Commison in proceeding to determine prudence of
ant costs, even though answers were disosed to manager; manager, that also was
•chitect and engineer, was only party in
>sition to verify factual assertions confined in draft answers; and since owners
id only 120 days to respond to interrogat e s , there was de facto compulsion to
sclose protected work product. Fed.
ules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(b)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.
I. Federal Civil Procedure «= 1600.4
Owners of nuclear power plant in aeon against construction manager and field
ibrication and piping contractors to recovr for allegedly faulty design and construeon waived work product protection with
aspect to consultant reports which were
isclosed to manager to be reviewed for
ictual accuracy and style before submision to New York Public Service Commision in proceeding to determine prudence of
lant costs; Commission did not require
sports; reports were disclosed to manager
rhen one owner's president had serious
oubts as to performance by manager,
fhich also served as architect and engieer; and owners could have requested
lanager to verify factual assertions while
eeping reports themselves confidential.

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER T. STONE & WEBSTER ENG.
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Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(b)(3), 28 U.S.
C.A.

Hughes, Syracuse, N.Y., John R. Ferguson,
Washington, D.C., of counsel.

13. Federal Civil Procedure «=> 1600.4
Field fabrication and piping contractors in action by nuclear power plant owners to recover for allegedly faulty design
and construction by construction manager
and contractors were entitled to discover
owners' documents which lost work product protection after owners waived it with
respect to manager; equal access of manager and contractors to documents was
necessary to place all parties on equal footing. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(b)(3), 28
U.S.C.A.

Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, 111., Hancock
& Estabrook, Syracuse, N.Y., for plaintiffs
Long Island Lighting, New York State
Electric & Gas, Rochester Gas & Electric
and Central Hudson Gas & Electric; G.
Christian Kronberg, Chicago, III., Donald J.
Kemple, Syracuse, N.Y., of counsel.

14. Federal Civil Procedure <3= 1600.2
Field fabrication and piping contractors in action by nuclear power plant owners to recover for allegedly faulty design
and construction by architect and engineering firm and contractors would be unable
without undue hardship to reconstruct
"Project Management Book," which was
work product prepared for proceeding before New York Public Service Commission
and, therefore, were entitled to discover
"Book"; "Book" took years to compile and
involved millions of documents. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 26(b)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.
15. Federal Civil Procedure «=»1415

Construction manager in action by nuclear power plant owners to recover for
allegedly faulty design and construction
was not entitled to depose owners' attorney
who also represented them in proceeding
before New York Public Service Commission to determine prudence of plant costs;
deposition would increase likelihood of attorney being called as witness; deposition
had potential for invasion of privileged or
protected material; and information sought
by manager could be obtained through interrogatories or by deposition of owners.
Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRules 26(b)(3), 26(c),
30(b)(6), 37(a), 28 U.S.C.A.

Hiscock & Barclay, Syracuse, N.Y., Swidler & Berlin, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff Niagara Mohawk Power; Richard K.

Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon, New York City, Costello Cooney &
Fearon, Syracuse, N.Y., for defendant
Stone & Webster Engineering; Harold G.
Levison, New York City, Vincent O'Neil,
Syracuse, N.Y., of counsel.
McNamee Lochner Titus & Williams, Attorneys for Defendants ITT Fluid Products
& ITT Fluid Technology, Albany, N.Y.,
Pepper Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia,
Pa., for defendants ITT Fluid Products &
ITT Fluid Technology; Scott A. Barbour,
Albany, N.Y., of counsel.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION
AND ORDER
McCURN, Chief Judge.
/. Overview
The plaintiffs are five utilities who own,
operate, and are tenants in common (together "the Cotenants") of the Nine Mile
Point 2 nuclear power plant in Scriba, New
York. The Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, ("Niagara Mohawk") as the managing cotenant, has been the primary actor in
coordinating efforts to develop the nuclear
facility. The four other utilities, namely
the Long Island Lighting Company, the
New York State Electric & Gas Corporation, the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, and the Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation, played some lesser role in
bringing Nine Mile Point 2 ("NMP2") to
completion. The plaintiffs have brought
this action against Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation ("SWEC"), ITT Fluid
Products Corporation, and ITT Fluid Technology Corporation (collectively "ITT') for
damages which allegedly resulted from the
faulty design and construction of the Nine
Mile Point 2 plant

There are currently a number of motions
pending before this court This memorandum decision and order addresses the following: (1) the motion by plaintiff Niagara
Mohawk for a protective order, pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), to prevent the deposition by SWEC of attorney Steven J. Agresta; (2) the motion by defendant SWEC for
a protective order, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.
P. 37(a), compelling William J. Donlon to
answer certain deposition questions; (3) the
cross motion by the plaintiffs, under Rule
26(c), for a protective order precluding the
defendants use and/or retention of certain
documents, and (4) the motion by ITT to
compel the production of certain documents
pursuant to Rule 37(a) Fed.R-Civ.P.
//. Background
In June of 1971 Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation was retained by the
Cotenants as the architect/engineer and
construction manager for a nuclear power
plant planned to be built in upstate New
York. The Nine Mile Point 2 nuclear power plant was to be owned by Niagara Mohawk and four other utilities. Construction commenced on the 1080 megawatt nuclear facility in 1975, the nuclear fuel was
loaded in 1986, and NMP2 went into commercial operation in 1988. The plaintiffs
hired ITT Grinnell Corporation in 1974 to
perform field fabrication and erection of
the piping at the,nuclear facility. ITT
Grinnell's alleged successors in business,
and the defendants in this suit, are ITT
Fluid Products Corporation and ITT Fluid
Technology Corporation (hereafter "ITT").
On April 16, 1982, the New York Public
Service Commission (the "PSC") issued a
decision stating that its future policy would
be to permit Niagara Mohawk and the Cotenants to recoup only those investments in
NMP2 that were made prudently. Thereafter, Niagara Mohawk and the Cotenants
retained Steven Agresta, a partner in the
law firm of Swidler & Berlin, to represent
it in an anticipated administrative proceeding before the PSC in which a determination would be made as to which of the
capital costs of NMP2 were prudently incurred. This "prudence proceeding" would
be of prime importance to the investor
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owned utilities who were then in the process of constructing the Nine Mile Point 2
facility. Under the PSC's regulatory
scheme, investor owned utilities are only
allowed to earn a profit and recoup costs
on monetary disbursements which are
"prudent" Any non-prudent costs must be
borne by the utilities' shareholders rather
than the customers. Moreover, the utilities
bear the burden of proving the propriety of
their capital investments. See generally,
N.Y.P.S.C. Case 29124, Proceeding on the
Motion of the Commission to Investigate
the Prudence of Costs Incurred for the
Construction of the Nine Mile Point $
Nuclear Generating Facility, (July 3,
1985).
The PSC initiated a prudence proceeding
into the costs of NMP2 on July 3, 1985.
Attached to the PSC's order were a number
of interrogatories to which the utilities
were required to respond within 120 days.
The PSC staff and the utilities never actually litigated the matter before the Commission. Rather, on the 18th of September, 1985, the staff of the Public Service
Commission and the Cotenants filed a joint
motion proposing a settlement as to the
amount of capital investment in NMP2
which would be deemed to have been prudently incurred.
Between November of 1985 and January
of 1986 the Public Service Commission conducted evidentiary hearings on the proposed settlement During these proceedings the Cotenants submitted testimony,
discovery responses, and legal briefs. The
PSC adopted a settlement on October 3,
1986, by which the utilities were permitted
to place $4.16 billion of the costs of NMP2
into the rate base. According to the utilities this amounted to a disallowance of
over $2 billion. The settlement is now on
appeal to the Appellate Division of the New
York State Supreme Court, preserving the
possibility of remand to the PSC for a full
prudence proceeding.
A key concern of the parties herein is the
extent to which documents prepared in anticipation of the PSC prudence proceeding
are subject to discovery in this action.
Many of the "prudence documents" are

already possessed by defendant SWEC. In
fact, SWEC, as the architect/engineer and
construction manager of NMP2, was in
possession of much of the factual information necessary to respond to the PSC prudence investigation. SWEC also participated in drafting substantial portions of
these prudence documents. However, the
ITT defendants did not assist in the drafting of any of these materials and currently
possess only a limited number of same.
The Prudence Documents
The Project Management Book
In April of 1983, well before the PSC
initiated the NMP2 prudence proceeding,
the Co-tenants, Swidler & Berlin, and
SWEC combined efforts to create documents which attempted to set forth facts
and circumstances substantiating the costs
of the Nine Mile Point 2 facility. This
document, termed the "Project Management Book", was to detail numerous aspects of the design and construction of
NMP2 including: an overall description of
the role of upper management; engineering and design; quality assurance; quality
control; procurement; contract administration; document control; cost estimating
and forecasting; construction management; the start-up process; testing, and
planning. The Project Management Book
(the "P.M. Book") was created to assist the
utilities in responding to any questions
posed by the PSC as part of the prudence
inquiry as well as in the affirmative assertion of their case before the Commission.
The P.M. Book was initiated by an April
1983 letter from Mr. William Donlon, the
President of Niagara Mohawk, to Mr.
Frank Reis, then President of SWEC, relaying the Co-tenants' plans to assemble information in anticipation of the PSC prudence
investigation. That letter stated in part
We believe that the best way to document the prudent management of the
project is to develop a book which would
be a detailed history of the project
management of NMP2. Such a book
would describe, among other things, how
engineering drawings were produced and
processed, the methods for developing
A.
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and revising cost estimates, the project's
quality assurance and control programs
and the supervision of contractors at the
site. This project management book
would not be an evaluation of management practices of Stone & Webster or
the cotenants. Rather, it would be a
detailed description of how the management structure evolved over time. It is
our belief that a document neutral in
tone and descriptive in nature would be
the most persuasive approach to showing
effective project managements
In the additional role of what Niagara Mohawk has termed a "paid litigation consultant", SWEC was to assist the utilities and
Swidler & Berlin in developing a history of
the operation of NMP2 which would help to
demonstrate to the PSC that the facility
was properly managed and its costs prudently incurred. SWEC was advised that
Mr. Agresta was to direct this effort on
behalf of Niagara Mohawk and the Co-tenants. For its part, SWEC appointed Harry
Reese, a former project manager at NMP2,
to head SWEC's fact finding team and coordinate efforts with the Swidler & Berlin
firm.
The P.M. Book, according to SWEC, was
developed over the course of 18 months
and was substantially completed in 1984.
Niagara Mohawk, however, contends that
this document was never actually completed. In any event, the documents which
comprise the P.M. Book are extensive. The
P.M. Book was created through a process
whereby the SWEC team drafted and redrafted portions of the book in accordance
with a detailed outline and subsequent editorial comments provided by Swidler &
Berlin.
B. The Draft Responses
On July 3, 1985, the PSC commenced its
investigation into the management and
costs of Nine Mile 2. As part of its investigation the PSC served hundreds of interrogatories on the utilities who own NMP2
requesting information concerning the nuclear plant The PSC ordered the utilities
to respond within 120 days. Mr. Agresta
and his law firm were charged by the utilities with drafting responses to the inter-
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rogatories. According to the October 10,
1988, declaration of Mr. Agresta, the persons who actually drafted the answers to
the PSC's questions were Thomas Lemberg
and other attorneys at the Swidler & Berlin
firm. Steven Agresta, who has been retained by Niagara Mohawk as a trial counsel in this action, asserts that he did not
author or assist in the selection of documents for any of the draft responses.
On July 24, 1985, Mr. Agresta sent draft
responses to PSC interrogatories # 2 and
# 8 to Harry Reese for SWEC's comments.
It is the plaintiffs' position that they had to
send these draft responses to SWEC so
that they could be reviewed for accuracy
before submission to the PSC. SWEC
claims to have also received a revised draft
of answers to certain unspecified interrogatories from Swidler & Berlin on September
27, 1985.
The interrogatories required an extensive
response. Question # 2 of Appendix A
stated in part
For each major management area—
project management, construction, engineering, licensing and regulatory affairs,
and quality assurance/quality control—
the co-tenants shall provide a written description of the methodologies or programs employed by the project in addressing the following managerial functions . . .
Question 8 of Appendix A -stated in part
The co-tenants shall explain what techniques were used to measure the performance of project management and to
control capital program costs . . .
SWEC retained a copy of the draft responses to these questions. These particular
draft responses were never filed by the
utilities with the PSC as part of the prudence proceedings. Rather, the parties
moved to settlement negotiations before
any response was required to be formally
submitted. However, the plaintiffs were
required to make other submissions to the
PSC as part of the process whereby the
PSC determined whether to adopt the proposed settlement; these documents are on
public record.
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Other Prudence Documents
Defendant ITT was not involved in the
velopment of the prudence documents
d requests that it be permitted additional
scovery to that discussed above. This
[>uld include all correspondence and other
euments transmitted between Niagara
ohawk, the Co-tenants, and Swidler &
srlin to and from SWEC which were conrned with issues relevant to the present
tion, as well as reports prepared by the
^tenants' consultants in preparation for
e prudence proceeding which were turned
rer to SWEC. It appears that consultant
ports were prepared by Cresap, McCorick & Paget, Bechtel Corporation, and
>rrey Pines Technology Inc.

6. September 1985 draft response to
Appendix B to the New York State Public Service Commission order instituting
the NMP2 prudence proceeding.
7. Testimony of Messrs. Rinalli, Terry
& Goyal dated October 30, 1985, in the
New York Public Service Commission
Case No. 29124 particularly concerning
the 41 "enhancements" at NMP2.
8. The Cresap, McCormick & Paget report entitled "Swidler, Berlin & Strelow
Step V—Assessment of Stone & Webster
project Management, November 1984,
Volumes I and II, including Swidler &
Berlin's comments on the report"
These are the types of documents which
ITT is apparently seeking to obtain
through discovery.
On November 7, 1988, ITT served a deand upon the plaintiffs for the production D. The Donlon Deposition
" documents. On December 12, 1988, the
SWEC deposed William Donlon, Chairlaintiffs served their response to this doc- man of the Board and Chief Executive Offiment demand objecting to the first 22 of cer of Niagara Mohawk, on November 9,
I numbered requests as demanding infor- 10, 30, and December 1, 1988. At the
lation covered by the attorney/client privi- deposition the plaintiffs' counsel contested
ge or protected under the attorney work the propriety of questions regarding stateroduct doctrine. Currently, however, ITT ments contained in certain prudence doc> in possession of a number of the these uments, instructing his client not to reocuments which were provided either as spond. ITT was represented by counsel at
xhibits to motion papers or given to ITT this deposition. During the course of the
y SWEC at the deposition of Mr. William deposition attorneys for SWEC marked as
•onion.
exhibits a number of the prudence docSWEC cites the following as documents uments and turned them over to ITT.
r
hich it was requested to prepare or comThe Present Proceedings and Motion
lent upon in the course of preparing for
On August 1, 1988, Niagara Mohawk and
le prudence proceeding.
1. July 1985 draft report on manage- the Co-tenants filed a complaint against
ment of NMP2 prepared for the New SWEC and the ITT defendants for damages arising out of the design, engineering,
York Public Service Commission.
and construction of NMP2. Through
2. September 1985 draft report on
claims sounding in both contract and tort,
management of NMP2 prepared for the
the plaintiffs seek to recover excess costs
New York Public Service Commission. associated with the defendants work in
3. September 1985 draft report on the such areas as overhead, overtime, delay in
Primary Containment Liner prepared for project completion, redesign, reconstructhe New York State Public Service Com- tion, and other alleged mismanagement
mission.
SWEC served an answer on August 30th
4. September 1985 draft report on the along with a notice to depose Steven Agres1974-75 slowdown prepared for the New ta, plaintiffs' counsel in the prudence proYork State Public Service Commission. ceeding, William Donlon, Chief Executive
5. September 1985 draft report on geol- Officer of Niagara Mohawk, and Paul
ogy prepared for the New York State Briggs, Chief Executive Officer of Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation.
Public Service Commission.
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A central issue presented by these mo- compelled to answer deposition questions
tions is whether the prudence documents concerning the prudence documents as they
are subject to discovery. The Cotenants are fair ground for discovery.
contend that all of the documents are pro///. Discussion
tected work product since they were prepared in anticipation of litigation. Plain- A. Discovery of Prudence Documents
tiffs request that the defendants be prohibThe scope of discovery under the Federal
ited from retaining or using any of the Rules of Civil Procedure is broad.1 The
prudence documents along with any notes Rules open to inquiry not only matters
which were made from these documents. which may be relevant to the subject matNiagara Mohawk asserts that the only rele- ter of the suit but matters which appear
vant information Mr. Agresta could provide "reasonably calculated to lead to the disis either privileged or protected "from dis- covery of admissible evidence." * From a
closure. On this basis Niagara Mohawk review of the complaint in this action it
seeks to have the deposition of Mr. Agresta cannot be disputed that the information
precluded, under Rule 26(c), or stayed sought by ITT and the information sought
pending defendants' attempts to secure the to be retained by SWEC is relevant for the
same information through other discovery purposes of discovery under the Federal
methods. Plaintiffs also seek a protective Rules.
order barring the deposition questioning of
"In Hickman v. Taylor, . . . the Court
William J. Donlon concerning documents recognized a qualified immunity from disdrafted in anticipation of the PSC prudence covery for the 'work product of the lawproceeding.
yer'; such material could only be discoverSWEC and ITT assert that the attorney ed upon a substantial showing of 'necessity
work product protection does not apply to or justification.'" F.T.C. v. Grolier Inc.t
the prudence documents or, in the alterna- 462 U.S. 19, 103 S.Ct 2209, 2212, 76 L.Ed.
tive, that any protection as to these doc- 2d 387 (1983). The holding of Hickman
uments was waived. Moreover, SWEC has largely been embodied in Fed.R.Civ.P.
maintains that the deposition of Steven 26(bX3) which outlines "the extent to which
Agresta should be permitted. SWEC trial preparation materials are discoverable
states that it does not intend to question in federal court" Id 103 S.Ct at 213.
Mr. Agresta about his legal thoughts or Rule 26(b)(3) provides in pertinent part
a party may obtain discovery of docconclusions as to the prudence documents.
uments and tangible things
prepared
Rather, SWEC will question Agresta about
the sources of his facts: the persons and
in anticipation of litigation or for trial by
documentary sources of information that
or for another party or by or for that
he relied upon to create both the draft
other party's representative (including
the other party's attorney, consultant,
responses to the PSC's interrogatories and
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)
the Project Management Book. Finally,
only upon a showing that the party seekSWEC asserts that Mr. Donlon should be
1. As stated in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 VS. 495.
67 S.Ct. 385, 392. 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947);
"[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring
into the facts underlying his opponent's case.
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the
other to disgorge what ever facts he has in his
possession."
2. Fed.RXiv.P. 26(b)(1) states in applicable part:
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the

subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition
and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter. It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the
trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
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ing discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of his case
and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other
means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has
been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
In other words, "three conditions must be
met to earn work product protection. The
material must (1) be a document or tangible
thing, (2) that was prepared in anticipation
of litigation, and (3) was prepared by or for
a party, or by or for his representative."
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dee.
18, 1981, etc, 561 F.Supp. 1247, 1257 (E.D.
N.Y.1982). "Once these conditions are satisfied, the party seeking discovery must
establish a substantial need for the material and a practical inability to secure the
substantial equivalent thereof by alternate
means." Id.

[2] The work product doctrine has been
held to protect documents prepared in anticipation of an administrative proceeding
such as the Public Service Commission's
prudence proceeding. Sprague v. Director
of Office of Worker's Compensation, 688
F.2d 862, 869-70 and n. 16 (1st Cir.1982).
Rule 26(bX3) also applies to protect work
product materials "prepared for a party's
representative, such as an attorney." Id.
at 870. However, the definition of the
term "representative" in Rule 26(bX3) goes
beyond attorney work product and includes
the work product prepared on an attorney's
behalf. As recited in Sprague:
[T]he Supreme Court noted in United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct
2160, [45 L.Ed.2d 141] (1976), [that] the
work-product doctrine must "necessarily" apply to materials prepared on an
attorney's behalf, id. [422 U.S.] at 239 n.
13, 95 S.CL at 2170 n. 13, because an
attorney must often rely on the assistance of others "in the compilation of
materials in the preparation for trial."
Id. at 238, 95 S.Ct at 2170. 'This view,"
the Court stated, "is reflected in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Rule
26(bX3)...." Id. at 239 n. 13, 95 S.Ct at
2170 n. 13.
688 F.2d at 870. Moreover, work-product
documents prepared for litigation in one
action are protected from discovery in a
subsequent related suit
Fed.R.Civ.P.
26(bX3) "protects materials prepared for
any litigation or trial as long as they were
prepared by or for a party to the subsequent litigation." F.T.C. v. Grolier Inc.,
103 S.Ct at 2213.

[1] In ordering discovery, after the required showing has been made by the party
seeking discovery, the court "shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories" contained within these documents.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(bX3). It is a necessary corollary that protected work product contained in documents and tangible things
cannot be obtained through less tangible
methods such as the deposition questioning
of persons with knowledge of the protected
information. See Hickman, 67 S.Ct at
393-94.*

[3,4] Many of the prudence documents
were prepared or reviewed by SWEC at the

3. As stated in Hickman 67 S.CL at 393:
I n our opinion, neither Rule 26 nor any other
rule dealing with discovery contemplates production under such circumstances. That is not
because the subject matter is privileged or irrelevant, as those concepts are used in these rules.
Here is simply an attempt, without purported
necessity or justification, to secure written state*
merits, private memoranda and personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties. As
such, it falls outside the arena of discovery and
contravenes the public policy underlying the
orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims.

Not even the most liberal of discovery theories
can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files
and the mental impressions of an attorney
Proper preparation of a client's case demands
that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be relevant from the irrelevant facts,
prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy
without undue and needless interference
This work is reflected, of course, in interviews,
statements.
memoranda.
correspondence,
briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and
countless other tangible and intangible ways—
aptly though roughly termed ... as the work
product of the lawyer.1*
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direction of the plaintiffs or their attorneys
and in anticipation of litigation before the
PSC. The same is true for the outside
consultant's reports on NMP2. Thus,
SWEC and the consultants were acting as
"representatives" of the plaintiffs within
the meaning of Rule 26(b)(3). Therefore,
the prudence documents were protected
work product for purposes of the PSC's
prudence proceeding. The present action is
closely related to the prudence proceeding
initiated before the PSC. Thus, the prudence documents qualify as protected work
product materials for purposes of this litigation. The issue therefore is whether the
work product protection was waived as to
the prudence documents which were turned
over to SWEC.
[5,6] Generally, the work product protection is waived when documents are voluntarily shared with an adversary or when
a party possessing the documents seeks to
selectively present the materials to prove a
point, but then attempts to invoke the privilege to prevent an opponent from challenging the assertion. United States v. Nobles,
422 U.S. 225, 239-40, 95 S.Ct 2160, 217071, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). Moreover, work
product protection is waived when protected materials are disclosed in a manner
which "substantially increases the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the
information." In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December 18, 1981 and January 4, 1982, 561 RSupp. 1247,1257 (E.D.N.
Y.1982); see GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); 8 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2024 at 209-210
(1970). However, sharing work product
material with a friendly party does not
waive the work product protection as it
applies to an adverse third party. United
States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292,
295-96 (Temp.Emer.CtApp.1985); Western
Fuels Ass'n v. Burlington Northern R.
Co., 102 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D.Wyo.1984). As
explained in United States v. Gulf Oil
Corp.,
[T]he work product privilege does not
exist to protect a confidential relationship, but rather to promote the adversary
system by safeguarding the fruits of an

attorney's trial preparations from the
discovery attempts of the opponent The
purpose of the work product doctrine is
to protect information against opposing
parties, rather than against all others
outside a particular confidential relationship, in order to encourage effective trial
preparation
A disclosure made in
the pursuit of such trial preparation,
and not inconsistent with maintaining
secrecy against opponents, should be
allowed without waiver of the privilege.
760 F.2d at 295 (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. American Tel and Tel
Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C.Cir.1980)).
The work product protection is afforded a
far broader scope than the attorney/client
privilege, the latter being waived when the
privileged information is disclosed to anyone, be they friend, foe, or merely neutral,
who is outside of the confidence of the
attorney client relationship. See In re
Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 80-82 (2nd Cir.1973)
(Friendly J.); United States v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 760 F.2d at 295; Matter of Grand
Jury Subpoena, Etc., Nov. IS 1974, 406
F.Supp. 381, 386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
However, courts have been willing to
preserve the work product protection over
documents in circumstances where the disclosure to a potential adversary was compelled. In Transamerica Computer Co.
Inc. v. International Business Afachinei
Corp., 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir.1978), a court
in a prior unrelated lawsuit had ordered
expedited production of some 17 millioi
documents by I.B.M. over a three montl
period. Though I.B.M. made great effort
to maintain the privilege as to certain o:
these documents, a number of them wen
still disclosed. In the Transamerica case
the plaintiffs sought to make use of th<
privileged documents disclosed in the previ
ous litigation in its case against I.B.M
The court upheld I.B.M.'s assertion that th
documents were protected, finding tha
there had been a "de facto compulsion" du
to "the imposition of an extremely rigorou
schedule for discovery." Id. at 651.
In Simpson v. Braider, 104 F.R.D. 515
522-23 (D.D.C.1985), the court held that th
production of privileged information by
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lefendant in a criminal prosecution, that
nformation being necessary to the defenlant's assertion of mitigating circumstances in connection with sentencing, could not
>e considered a voluntary disclosure,
rherefore, the documents retained their
privileged status in a subsequent litigation.
r
d. at 522. In holding the information projected, the court noted the general relucance "to find a waiver of a privilege when
protected material] is involuntarily given
tuch as pursuant to a subpoena, or to defend against criminal charges or under circumstances indicating there was realisticaly no voluntary disclosure." Id. at 523.
rhough the court made this general statement with regard to the waiver of the
attorney/client privilege, it applies equally
to the work product privilege, the work
product protection being broader in scope
than the attorney /client privilege. United
States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 P.2d at 295.
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time of any disclosure and (2) that any
disclosure to SWEC was compelled. The
Cotenants assert that throughout their relationship with SWEC they never intended
to waive the work product protection over
the prudence documents, noting that almost all of the documents which were
transmitted between plaintiffs and SWEC
were marked "Attorney Work Product
Privileged and Confidential"

Plaintiffs characterize SWEC's role as
that of a "litigation consultant," as well as
the architect/engineer and construction
manager of the NMP2 project They maintain, that since the complaint raises no
claims against SWEC with respect to work
performed as litigation consultants, the
documents written or reviewed by SWEC
are not needed for their defense. It is
asserted that the consultant/ client relationship between plaintiffs and SWEC is analogous to one in which an attorney is sued by
[7,8] Moreover, the protection afforded a client for injuries suffered when hit by a
work product materials is not waived when car driven by the attorney. Plaintiffs condisclosure occurs through excusable inad- tend that, as the attorney could not then
vertence. United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d disclose client confidences obtained while
1411, 1417 (9th Cir.1987), cert granted on previously defending the client in a divorce
other grounds, — U.S.
, 109 S.Ct action, see U.S. v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287,
257, 102 L.Ed.2d 246 (1988). The Zolin 292 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1109,
court, for example, found that no waiver 106 S.Ct 1518, 89 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986),
had taken place with regard to tapes SWEC must maintain the confidential relaturned over to an adversary by a secretary tionship in this suit
who was under the mistaken impression
Plaintiffs contend that the practical cirthat they were blank. Id. The knowing cumstances surrounding the preparation of
release of otherwise privileged documents materials for the prudence proceeding comconstitutes a waiver and is not inadvertent, pelled them to transfer prudence docwhile a simple mistake, "immediately rec- uments to SWEC for review. In the pruognized and rectified" is not a waiver of dence proceeding the Cotenants were rethe work product protection. See Lois quired to justify the costs incurred in the
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & construction of NMP2. Failure to do so
Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105-06 (S.D.N.Y.1985) would result in the costs being disallowed.
(protected documents inadvertently produc- Since SWEC was in control of the vast
ed in the course of large scale discovery did majority of information needed to make
not lose protected status).
plaintiffs' case and because billions of dollars were at stake, plaintiffs claim that
Plaintiff's Position
they were required to employ SWEC to
The Cotenants have moved for the entry prepare for the proceeding. According to
of a protective order to preclude defen- the Cotenants, SWEC was the only party in
dants' use and retention of the prudence a position to verify facts contained in the
documents. Plaintiffs claim that they did prudence documents. Moreover, because
not waive the work product protection be- the draft answers to interrogatories were
cause (1) SWEC was a consultant at the required to be submitted to the PSC,

SWEC's verification of the documents was
needed to avoid committing perjury.
The Cotenants argue that utilities should
not be placed in a position where they have
to choose between protecting their rights in
a prudence proceeding and protecting their
rights as against the construction manager
of a project It is asserted that neither
SWEC nor ITT have shown a substantial
need for the prudence documents, that the
defendants are the ones in possession of
the vast majority of the facts, and. that the
plaintiffs have filed with the PSC, and
made part of the public record, the prudence material that was actually adopted
by the plaintiffs in the course of reaching a
settlement with the PSC. The Cotenants
assert that defendants can fulfill their discovery requirements without the prudence
documents.
Plaintiffs argue that the prudence documents represent the tentative testing of
advocacy positions against the facts of the
case and therefore should not be subject to
use by the opposing parties. The use of
lawyer drafts, according to plaintiffs, ultimately interferes with the plaintiffs' right
to effective assistance of counsel.
Defendants' Position
While not conceding that the prudence
documents constitute work product, defendants focus their argument on the question
of waiver. It is asserted that any protection which may have once attached to the
documents was waived because plaintiffs
(1) brought suit against SWEC (2) the suit
concerned the same subject matter as the
prudence documents and (3) the prudence
documents had been freely transferred to
SWEC. Moreover, defendants assert that
plaintiffs admitted in their motion papers
concerning the deposition of Steven Agresta that they had waived the work product
protection as it related to the prudence
documents.
SWEC and ITT contend that the prudence documents are particularly relevant
because statements contained therein are
inconsistent with the allegations made in
the complaint, and thus, may constitute
admissions under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Fed-
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eral Rules of Evidence. Under this theory
it is necessary to inquire into the basis of
the statements, the process used, and documents relied upon when writing the prudence documents so that defendants can
determine (1) whether or not the statements will be admissible and (2) if admissible what evidence will be brought out by
the plaintiffs to impeach or temper the
damaging admissions.
Defendants maintain that the Cotenants
were not compelled to employ SWEC when
preparing documents for the prudence proceeding; rather, SWEC could have been
requested to provide strictly factual information to the plaintiffs' litigation team,
that team then proceeding in a completely
confidential manner. Thus, according to
defendants, the transfer of the prudence
documents to SWEC was neither inadvertent nor compelled. SWEC notes that the
plaintiffs spent many years preparing for
the prudence proceeding. Under such circumstances there was no time pressure
requiring plaintiffs to either use SWEC or
go without a thorough defense. SWEC
claims that an appropriate analogy to this
case is the attorney malpractice action in
which an attorney may disclose otherwise
privileged communications to defend himself against charges of improper conduct
without violating the attorney client privilege. See e.g. U.S. v. Ballard, 779 F.2d at
291-92.
SWEC and ITT claim that the subject
matter of the prudence documents involves
the same matters which are at issue'in this
suit—the design and construction of the
NMP2 project The work product protection is waived when the documents are
disclosed to a person in a manner which
substantially increases the likelihood that
they will be obtained by an opponent See
e.g. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 561
F.Supp. 1247, 1257 (E.D.N.Y.1982). Defendants assert that plaintiffs knew SWEC
was a potential legal adversary at the time
the prudence documents were disclosed.
SWEC cites the transcript of the Donlon
deposition at pages 299 and 313 to support
this position. Though, Mr. Donlon, the
President and Chief Executive Officer of
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Niagara Mohawk, did not state that plaintiffs were contemplating a lawsuit against
SWEC, he did state that he was very disappointed with SWEC's performance as far
back as 1980. SWEC argues that such
disappointment reveals that there was a
potential for an adversary relationship of
which the plaintiffs were aware at the time
the prudence documents were disclosed to
SWEC. By proceeding to disclose the documents in the face of the potential dispute,
plaintiffs allegedly waived the privilege.
Waiver of Work Product Protection
The parties do not draw distinctions between the prudence documents; the plaintiffs request a protective order covering all
such materials while defendants argue for
full disclosure. There are, however, significant differences between the documents
which bear on the issue of whether a waiver has occurred. As noted above, the prudence documents fall into three general
categories: the Project Management Book,
the draft answers to the PSC's interrogatories, and the consultant reports.

compelled. See e.g. Transamerica Computer Co. Inc. v. International Business
Machines Corp., 573 F.2d at 651; Simpson
v. Braider, 104 F.R.D. at 522-23; see also
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105-06
(S.D.N.Y.1985).
The parties advance many compelling arguments in support of their respective positions concerning discovery of the prudence
documents. Two points are of particular
relevance to the court's decision in this
matter (1) the President of plaintiff Niagara Mohawk, William Donlon, appears to
have been cognizant of the potential for an
adversarial legal relationship with SWEC,
and (2) the plaintiffs were required to respond to the PSC's interrogatories under
penalty of perjury.

[101 The plaintiffs have waived the
work product protection with respect to the
Project Management Book. This document, though the brainchild of the plaintiffs, was written by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation in accordance with
[9] This court has determined as a an outline provided by the plaintiffs. The
threshold matter that the prudence doc- P.M. Book was not placed in the possession
uments which were transferred to SWEC of SWEC by a process which could be
constitute work product under Rule 26(bX3) termed excusable inadvertence, see e.g.
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d at 1417, or
The issue, therefore, is whether the plain- through force of compulsion. See Transtiffs waived the work product protection. america Computer Co. v. International
Generally, the work product protection is Business Machines Corp., 573 F.2d at 651.
waived when protected materials are dis- The document was developed over the
closed in a manner which is either incon- course of many years and during a time
sistent with maintaining secrecy against when the PSC had not yet initiated the
opponents or substantially increases the op- prudence proceeding. Moreover, plaintiffs
portunity for a potential adversary to ob- were apparently cognizant of the potential
tain the protected information. See United for an adversary legal relationship with
States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d at 295; SWEC. Under such circumstances the
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated De- plaintiffs could have created the P.M. Book
cember 18, 1981 and January 4, 1989, 561 without SWEC directly assisting in draftF.Supp. 1247, 1257 (E.D.N.Y.1982); GAF ing the document The P.M. Book was,
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. therefore, treated in a manner which "sub46, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y.1979); 8 Wright and stantially increased] the opportunity for
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure potential adversaries to obtain the informa§ 2024 at 209-10 (1970). However, courts tion." In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Datare sometimes willing to preserve the work ed December 18, 1981 and January 4*
product protection, as well as the more 198% 561 F.Supp. at 1257. Under these
restricted attorney/client privilege, in situ- circumstances, this court concludes that
ations where the disclosure was essentially plaintiffs have waived the protection cover-

ing the P.M. Book; it is properly the subject of discovery.
[11] This court holds, however, that the
draft answers to the PSC's interrogatories
have retained their protected status and
therefore are not subject to discovery by
the defendants. These documents were
written by the plaintiffs' attorneys, for
submission in an adversarial proceeding,
and at the direction of a government agency to whom the Cotenants were legally
responsible. Thus, the draft answers contained the initial testing of legal opinions
and theories by plaintiffs' counsel; this
constitutes core work product material.
See Hickman v. Taylor, 67 S.Ct at 393.
Moreover, the plaintiffs were responsible
for being able to substantiate the assertions made in those documents under
threat of perjury. Since SWEC was the
architect/engineer and construction manager of NMP2, it was the only party in a
position to verify the factual assertions
contained in the draft answers. Given the
relatively short 120 day time period in
which the Cotenants were required to develop responses to the PSC's interrogatories, practical circumstances required the
Cotenants to disclose the draft answers to
SWEC. Under these circumstances there
was a "de facto compulsion" to disclose the
protected work product in a manner similar
to that in Transamerica Computer Co. v.
International Business Machines Corp.,
573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir.1978).
[12] The consultant reports present a
close question. On the one hand they were
written by consultants to the plaintiffs in
anticipation of litigation. This would normally subject the documents to the work
product protection under Fed.R.Civ.P.
26(bX3) and (4). However, these documents were turned over to SWEC to be
reviewed for factual accuracy as well as
edited for style. There is nothing in the
record which indicates that the PSC required the consultant reports to be commissioned or submitted as part of the prudence
proceeding. These documents were not
prepared under strict time constraints or
the threat of perjury as were the draft
responses to the PSC's interrogatories.
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Thus, the disclosure of these documents *
SWEC was not under force of compulsio
Given the evidence that the Preside!
and Chief Executive Officer of Niaga
Mohawk had serious doubts as to the pe
formance of SWEC as far back as 1980 it
apparent that this was a knowing disci
sure to a potential adversary. As not
above, such disclosure operates to war
the work product protection. The Cote
ants could have prevented the transfer
the consultant reports to SWEC by l
questing verification of the factual ass<
tions contained in the reports while keepii
the reports themselves confidential. T
transfer of consultant reports to SWEC
1984 and 1985 was a disclosure of confide
tial information that was neither necessa
or compelled. Therefore, the court deni
plaintiffs motion to have the consults
reports returned. Those reports w«
treated in a manner inconsistent with 1
maintenance of the attorney work prodi
protection and are now properly the subj<
of discovery.
B. The Donlon Deposition
The plaintiffs have moved for a prot
tive order, pursuant to Rule 26(c), to p
vent the deposition questioning of Willi
Donlon concerning statements made in c
tain prudence documents. The basis
this motion is that those documents .
protected as work product and, thus, def
dant SWEC is barred from employing th
in discovery. Now that the work prod
protection issue is settled, it this com
ruling that Mr. Donlon answer any qu
tions which are based on prudence c
uments which are not protected work pr
uct Defendants are thus free to ask qu
tions concerning the consultants report i
the Project Management Book. Howei
the defendants are precluded from inq
ing into the draft answers to the PS
interrogatories.
C. HTs Motion to Compel Disclos
[13] In opposition to HTs motion
compel the prudence documents plaint
argue (1) that the documents constat
protected work product material which

592

125 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS

maintained its protection as against SWEC
and is therefore protected from disclosure
to ITT (2) that work product which is
shared with a litigation consultant maintains its protection as against third parties
and (3) that ITT has failed to make the
requisite showing under Rule 26(bX3) (that
there is a substantial need and an inability
without undue hardship to obtain the equivalent of the prudence documents by other
means). Plaintiffs assert that even should
this court hold the work product protection
waived as to SWEC, ITT should not be
provided with the prudence documents.
This, because such a denial of discovery
would prejudice ITT only to the extent that
any party who is denied access to an opposing party's work product is prejudiced.
The Cotenants maintain that ITT possesses
most of the facts relevant to this suit and
that those underlying facts it desires are
freely discoverable. Finally, plaintiffs assert that as a large corporation with sophisticated counsel, ITT has the resources to
reconstruct a factual history of NMP2 sufficient to litigate this action. Plaintiffs,
however, are unable to cite case law which
directly supports the proposition that the
waiver of a plaintiffs work product protection as to one defendant does not waive the
protection as to a second defendant in the
same action.
[14] Notwithstanding the Cotenants' assertions, this court holds that ITT may
proceed with discovery of the non-protected
prudence documents under dispute in this
motion to the same extent as SWEC. The
P.M. Book was developed over the course
of many years by persons intimately involved in the construction of NMP2. It is
clear that ITT, no matter what its resources, would be "unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(bX3). However, even if
ITT could reconstruct such a document this
court would still order disclosure. Equal
access of both defendants to the prudence
documents is necessary to place all parties
on an equal footing. It would certainly be
unfair to permit one defendant to employ
documents in discovery and, potentially, at
trial while barring a co-defendant from
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making use of the same documents. ITT
would also be prejudiced by the delay'involved in being required to piece together
information which took years to compile
and involved literally millions of documents. However, while ITT may discover
and inquire into the non-protected work
product material in the same manner as
SWEC, it too must return or destroy any
answers to the PSC interrogatories which
it may have received in the course of this
litigation. Defendants may retain their
notes of the draft answers to the PSC
interrogatories but they are barred from
using of the notes in this litigation.
D. The Agresta Deposition
[15] The plaintiffs have moved for a
protective order, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c),
to prevent the deposition of Steven J.
Agresta. Mr. Agresta was counsel for the
plaintiffs in. the prudence proceeding before the PSC. He has also been retained
as trial counsel in the present litigation.
SWEC has noticed the deposition of Mr.
Agresta. Plaintiffs assert that the deposition of counsel should not be permitted
unless there has been a showing that the
information sought cannot be obtained by
other means. This, because the attorney
work product doctrine as well as practice
consistent with our system of jurisprudence makes such a deposition an inappropriate method of discovering the desired
information.
SWEC wants to ask Mr. Agresta about a
number of items which they claim are neither privileged nor protected, including the
names of persons and the location of documents which Agresta relied upon when
representing the plaintiffs in the prudence
proceeding. Defendants also want to question Mr. Agresta about specific statements
which were made in the prudence documents in order to determine exactly what
information supplied the basis for a particular statement Moreover, the defendants
want to review the process by which the
prudence documents were developed so
that the credibility of the documents and
the potential for impeachment of the statements contained therein can be ascertained.

Defendants claim that there is no better
person than Agresta for locating the
sources of information relevant to this suit
Defendants claim that they would not inquire into Agresta's mental impressions
and legal conclusions with respect to these
documents.
The law on this issue seems to be moving
toward a position where courts generally
will permit the deposition of opposing counsel only upon a showing of substantial need
and only after alternate discovery avenues
have been exhausted or proven impractical.4 That is so despite the fact that Fed.R.
Civ.P. 30(a) does not afford attorneys any
special protection from being deposed.5
Courts have become critical of the increasing use of depositions against opposing
counsel. As stated in Shelton v. American Motors Corp.:
Taking the deposition of opposing counsel not only disrupts the adversarial system and lowers the standards of the profession, but it also adds to the already
burdensome time and cost of litigation.
It is not hard to imagine additional pretrial delays to resolve work-product and
attorney-client objections, as well as delays to resolve collateral issues raised by
the attorney's testimony. Finally, the
practice of deposing opposing counsel detracts from the quality of client representation. Counsel should be free to devote
his or her time and efforts to preparing
the client's case without fear of being
interrogated by his or her opponent
Moreover, the "chilling effect" that such
practice will have on the truthful communications from the client to the attorney
is obvious.
805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir.1986). See
N.F.A. Corp. v. Riverview Narrow Fabrics, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 83, 84-86 (M.D.N.C.
1987); In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litigation, 92 F.R.D. 429, 437-39
(E.D.Pa.1981); Walker v. United Parcel

Services, 87 F.R.D. 360, 361-62 (E.D.Pa.
1980). Moreover, the deposition of counsel
increases the likelihood that the attorney
will be called as a witness at trial. Under
such circumstances the attorney would normally be disqualified from providing further services. "N.YJud.Law, Disciplinary
Rule 5-102(A) (McKinney 1975) of the Code
of Professional Responsibility requires that
when 'it is obvious that [a lawyer] . . .
ought to be called as a witness on behalf ot
his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial.'" United States v.
McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 29 (2nd Cir.1984).
This school of thought also asserts that
the act of choosing which documents to
review and which persons to interview is
itself a reflection of a lawyer's thought
process and, as such, is protected work
product For example in Shelton the court
held that where "the deponent is opposing
counsel and has engaged in a selective process of compiling documents from among
voluminous files in preparation for litigation, the mere acknowledgment of the existence of those documents would reveal
counsel's mental impressions which are
protected as work product" Id. at 1326.
To protect attorney work product, as well
as for other prudential reasons, the Shelton court limited the deposition of opposing
counsel to situations where "the party
seeking to take the deposition has shown
that (1) no other means exist to obtain the
information than to depose opposing counsel . . . ; (2) the information sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the preparation of the
case." Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327 (8th Cu\
1986). There is no Second Circuit case
directly on point The plaintiffs, however,
cite Gould v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting
Co., which in dicta stated that the Shelton
court's concern with the deposition of op-

4. There are instances where the deposition of an S. Fed.RXiv.P. 30(a) states simply states that
attorney is clearly appropriate. This is usually
tajfter commencement of the action, any party
where the attorney is a fact witness or an actor,
may take the testimony of any person, including
the creator of non-privileged records, or the
a party, by deposition upon oral examination."
attorney's advice is used by the client as a deEmphasis added. See Shelton v. American Mofense. See N.F.A. Corp. v. Riverview Narrow tors Corp., 80S FJd 1323, 1327 (8th Cir.1986).
Fabrics. Inc., 117 F.R.D. S3, 85 n. 2 (M.D.N.C.
1987) and cases cited therein.
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pos'nfe counsel is "generally well taken."
825 F.2d 676, 680 n. 2 (2nd Cir.1987).
In support of their request that Mr.
Agresta submit to a deposition, SWEC first
notes that Rule 30(a) does not provide opposition counsel with any special protection
from being deposed. There is a basis in
ease law for the position that an attorney
cannot avoid a deposition by asserting that
lie or she has no relevant, nonprivileged
information, see Cooper v. Welch Foods,
Inc., 105 F.R.D. 4, 6 (W.D.N.Y.1984); Shiner v. American Stock Exchange, 28 F.R.D.
34, 35 (S.D.N.Y.1961), and that, at a minimum, the attorney must submit to a deposition so that his lack of knowledge may be
bested and any claimed privilege placed on
the record, any motion for a protective
order at this time being premature. Hunt
Intern. Resources Corp. v. Binstein, 98
P.R.D. 689, 690 (N.D.I11.1983); Scovill
Manufacturing Company v. Sunbeam
Corporation, 61 F.R.D. 598, 603 (D.Del.
1973); Shiner v. American Stock Exchange, 28 F.R.D. at 35. Respected commentators have also asserted that the attorney's knowledge concerning the facts
and sources of information relied upon in
creating work product are not protected
work product and may properly be the subject of discovery. According to Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil § 2023, p 194 (1970):
The courts have consistently held that
the work product concept furnishes no
shield against discovery, by interrogatories or by deposition, of the facts that
the adverse party's lawyer has learned,
or the persons from whom he has
learned such facts, or the existence or
nonexistence of documents, even though
the documents themselves may not be
subject to discovery.
Under this view Mr. Agestra would probably be subject to deposition by Stone &
Webster to find out about the people and
documents he relied upon while drafting
the prudence proceeding papers. This
court also notes the strong dissent in the
Shelton case which argued that the attorney deposition should be allowed in order
to discover the existence of documents-
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citing the rule as espoused by Wright &
Miller.
This court finds that due in part to tne
potential for the invasion of privileged or
protected material, as well as for other
prudential reasons discussed above, a protective order, pursuant to Rule 26(c) should
issue to stay the deposition of Mr. Agresta.
"Because deposition of a party's attorney is
usually both burdensome and disruptive,
the mere request to depose a party's attorney constitutes good cause for obtaining a
Rule 26(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., protective order."
N.F.A. Corp. v. Riverview Narrow Fabrics, Inc., 117 P.R.D. at 85. Plaintiffs argue effectively that the same information
which is sought in the deposition of Mr.
Agresta can be obtained through interrogatories. Niagara Mohawk also cites Rule
30(b)(6) as a feasible alternative to Stone &
Webster's request to depose Mr. Agresta.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(bX6) provides that a party
may name a corporation as the deponent
"and describe with particularity the matters on which examination is requested."
The corporation then must designate a person to testify on behalf of the corporation
and the matters on which that person will
testify. If Niagara Mohawk conducts discovery in good faith these devices should
be sufficient
If it should appear that defendants' future discovery progress has been frustrated by plaintiffs' intransigence, and other
federal discovery procedures have proven
to be futile, the defendants may always
return to the court for appropriate relief.
IV. Conclusion
This court hereby
ORDERS, that:
(1) the motion by plaintiff Niagara Mohawk for a protective order, pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), to prevent the deposition of Steven J. Agresta is GRANTED;
(2) the motion by defendant Stone &
Webster Engineering Corporation for an
order, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a), compelling William J. Donlon to answer certain
deposition questions is GRANTED to the
extent that he is not questioned concerning
statements made in documents which have

been classified as the draft answers to PSC
interrogatories;
(3) the cross motion by plaintiffs, under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), for a protective order
precluding the defendants use and/or retention of documents which have been
termed "prudence documents" is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as described in the body of this opinion; and
(4) the motion by ITT to compel the production of certain documents, pursuant to
Rule 37(a) Fed.R.Civ.P., is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part as described in
the body of the opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Jose VENTURA, on behalf of himself
and on behalf of all others similarly
situated. Plaintiffs,
v.
NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, a municipal
entity, Woodhull Hospital, a hospital
facility within and part of the New
York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, Doctor Benker, Chief/Head of
Employee Health Services Unit of the
Woodhull Hospital, Carlos Loran, Administrator of the Woodhull Hospital
Facility, Doctor Jo Ivey Bofford, Chief
Operating/Executive Officer of the
New York City Health and Hospitals
Corporation, Defendants.
No. 88 Civ. 0334 (JMW).
United States District Court,
S.D. New York.
Jan. 11, 1989.
Employee who brought civil rights action challenging hospital's drug testing policies moved for order certifying action as
class action. The District Court, Walker,
J., held that action would be conditionally

certified as class action, with class comprised of all employees of hospital facilities
previously subjected to drug testing without their consent, pending further discovery relating to numerosity of class
members.
Motion conditionally granted.
1. Federal Civil Procedure *»172
When considering whether to certify
class, court should take allegations of merits of case, as set forth in complaint, to be
true. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(a), 28
U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure «=»172
Party seeking class certification has
burden of establishing that prerequisites of
class action rule are satisfied. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 23(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure «=»184.5
Employee's action challenging hospital's drug testing policies would be conditionally certified as class action, although
employee lacked knowledge as to exact
number of employees subjected to drug
testing without their consent, where hospital had means to identify which employees
were tested for drugs, and which consent
forms, if any, were given to each employee
tested, and thus employee could obtain
such information through discovery. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(a), 28 U.S.OA.
4. Federal Civil Procedure *»163
Plaintiffs lack of knowledge as to exact number of affected persons is not bar
to maintaining class action, when defendants have means to identify those persons
at will. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRule 23(a), 28
U.S.OA.
5. Federal Civil Procedure «»184.5
Employee's assertion that at least 100
hospital employees, and numerous other
hospital employees working in similar facilities had been subject to drug testing without their consent, was sufficient to satisfy
numerosity requirement for obtaining class
certification in action challenging hospital's
drug testing policies. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
Rule 23(a), 28 U.S.OA.
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Plaintiffs counsel asserts that at no
point during these pre-filing contacts did
defendants' counsel expressly deny the factual allegations of the complaint As such,
plaintiffs counsel argues that the lack of a
denial inferentially supported plaintiffs belief that its factual allegations were "well
grounded in fact."
Research has uncovered no Rule 11 cases
which involved similar circumstances. It
may be argued that, by giving defendants
a pre-filing opportunity to deny the factual
allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was
engaging in the type of careful investigation that Rule 11 requires. Several factors
weigh against this conclusion, however.
First, plaintiffs counsel apparently never
asked defense counsel about the factual
basis for the complaint; rather, plaintiffs
sole purpose in forwarding the complaint
evidently was to encourage settlement of
all disputes between the parties. It, therefore, is difficult to construe defendants'
failure to deny the factual allegations as an
implicit acknowledgement of their truth.
Second, plaintiffs counsel admitted during
the oral argument of this motion that defendants had, in substance, previously denied similar allegations of antitrust violations. Indeed, plaintiffs counsel stated
that, even had defendants expressly denied
the factual allegations, he likely would not
have believed them. Third, accepting plaintiffs argument could effectively shift the
burden of compliance with Rule 11. In
every case in which advance notice of a
lawsuit was provided, the party receiving
such notice would be required to make
point-by-point denials of the complaint's
factual allegations or risk waiving the ability to seek Rule 11 sanctions. Neither the
language nor the purpose of the 1983
amendments to Rule 11 supports such a
result
B. Selection of Sanctions
Because the Court concludes that Rule
11 has been violated, the imposition of
sanctions is required. See Westmoreland,
770 F.2d at 1174-75. The selection of an
appropriate sanction, however, is left to the
discretion of the district court Id. at 1178.
Rule 11 provides for an award of expenses
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"incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper." Thus, courts
typically require the party who has violated
Rule 11 to compensate the opposing party
for his attorneys' fees and costs related to
responding to the improper pleading. See
Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1178-79; Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New
York, 762 F.2d at 254 n. 7; Hudson v.
Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F.Supp.
467, 484-85 (N.D.Cal.1985).
[5] The Court has carefully reviewed
the detailed statement of attorney's fees
and expenses submitted by defendants and
concludes that the amount requested is excessive. From the outset of this case, defendants insisted that no foundation existed for plaintiffs allegations. Nevertheless, defendants' counsel launched a fullscale assault on all the legal issues raised
by the complaint. Five attorneys and additional paralegals spend countless hours researching a variety of antitrust, class certification, Rule 11, and factual issues; however, the results of much of that research
were not reasonably necessary to achieve
dismissal of the case. Such a response was
unreasonably disproportionate.

For the reasons outlined above, the
Court finds that an award of $32,103.78 is
appropriate as a sanction for violation of
Rule 11.
[6] The sole remaining question is apportionment of the sanction. As plaintiffs
counsel noted, plaintiff relied entirely on
the advice of its attorneys in prosecuting
this case. However, a party is not absolved of responsibility under Rule 11 simply because he is ignorant of the law.
Danik authorized the prosecution of this
lawsuit albeit on the advice of counsel and
must assume some of the burden of sanctions. For this reason, counsel for Danik—
the law firm of Cooter & Gell—will be
assessed a sanction of $21,402.52 and Danik will be required to pay the remaining
amount of $10,701.26. Because counsel for
Hartmarx has already been paid its fees,
the sanctions shall be paid directly to Hartmarx.

Particularly unreasonable were defendants' research efforts regarding class certification. While the issue might ultimately
have been presented for the Court's determination, defendants' insistence that plaintiff had failed to state a claim rendered the
certification issue secondary. Legal efforts regarding that issue would have been
appropriate only after plaintiffs complaint
survived a 12(b)(6) challenge, which it did
not.

III. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that, under the objective test used in assessing Rule 11 motions, plaintiff failed to make a "reasonable
inquiry" into the factual allegations contained in the complaint. The record establishes that plaintiff made an inadequate
investigation of its claim that defendants
maintained an exclusive retailer agency
policy, and that plaintiff made no investigation into its claims of price-fixing, resale
price maintenance, and other anticompetitive practices. While Danik's counsel is
primarily responsible for this neglect, Danik authorized this lawsuit and must bear a
portion of the sanction.

In addition, the Court finds excessive the
staffing of this case by defendants' counsel
and the amount of research effort devoted
to the Rule 11 issue and motion to dismiss.
The repeated travels of one associate from
Chicago to Washington seem especially unreasonable. This associate's many hours
of research and writing on Rule 11 and the
repeated review of his work by at least
three other attorneys unjustifiably multiplied the amount of effort required to produce a superior brief on this issue.

ORDER
Upon consideration of defendants' Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the oppositions
thereto, and the record herein, and for the
reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, it is this 25th day of February,
1988
ORDERED that defendants' motion be,
and hereby is, granted; and it is further
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ORDERED that the law firm of Cooter
& Gell shall forthwith pay to the Hartmarx
Corporation Twenty-One Thousand Four
Hundred Fifty-Two Dollars and Fifty-Two
Cents ($21,452.52) as a sanction for violating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11;
and it is further
ORDERED that Danik, Incorporated
shall forthwith pay to the Hartmarx Corporation Ten Thousand Seven Hundred One
Dollars and Twenty-Six Cents ($10,701.26)
as a sanction for violating Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR TECHNICAL
AMENDMENT
The Motion of Danik, Inc. for Technical
Amendment of the Memorandum dated
February 25, 1988, having come before the
Court without opposition of Hartmarx Corporation, it is hereby ORDERED that the
said Memorandum shall be amended to reflect that H. Kenneth Kudon was not in the
law firm of Cooter & Gell and did not
represent Danik at the time the complaint
was prepared or filed in the captioned case,
and did not violate Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
{O

f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM*

INTERNATIONAL DIGITAL SYSTEMS
CORPORATION,
v.

DIGITAL EQUIPMENT
CORPORATION.
Civ. A. No. 87-053&-S.
United States District Court,
D. Massachusetts.
June 6, 1988.
Plaintiff sought protective order compelling defendant to return copies of documents which were protected by attorneyclient privilege and which plaintiff turned
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over to defendant allegedly inadvertently
as part of document production in case.
The District Court, Robert B. Collings,
United States Magistrate, held that disclosure of documents protected by attorneyclient privilege operated as waiver of attorney-client privilege as to any documents
disclosed by inadvertence, and therefore,
plaintiff was not entitled to return of inadvertently disclosed documents.
Order denied.
Federal Civil Procedure <s=»1600.4
Disclosure of documents protected by
attorney-client privilege in course of pretrial discovery in which documents were
being produced pursuant to Rule 34 operated as waiver of attorney-client privilege as
to any documents disclosed by inadvertence, and therefore, disclosing party was
not entitled to return of inadvertently disclosed documents. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
Rule 34, 28 U.S.C.A.
Joel Lewin, Dennis M. Ryan, Elissa Tonkin, Hinckley, Allen, Snyder & Comen, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.
Robert J. Stillman, William L. Patton,
Ropes & Gray, Boston, Mass., for defendant
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON INTERNATIONAL DIGITAL SYSTEMS
CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER (# 36)
ROBERT B. COLLINGS, United
States Magistrate.
The plaintiff International Digital Systems Corporation (hereinafter, "IDSC")
seeks a protective order compelling the defendant, Digital Equipment Corporation
1. DEC claims that the disclosure operated not
only as a waiver of the documents actually
disclosed but also as to undisclosed documents
otherwise subject to the privilege but which
bear on the same subject-matter. I rejected
DECs claim in this regard by an endorsement
on its motion to compel dated May 31, 1988
denying the motion; I can find no case in which
an unintentional or inadvertent disclosure has
been found to be a waiver of the privilege as to
undisclosed documents concerning the same

(hereinafter, "DEC"), to return copies of
twenty documents which are protected by
the attorney-client privilege but Vhich
IDSC turned over to DEC, allegedly inadvertently, as part of the document production in this case. The issue is whether the
disclosure by IDSC is to be held to be a
waiver of the privilege as to the documents
disclosed.
There is no dispute that the documents
are protected by the attorney-client privilege if the privilege has not been waived.
There is also no dispute that the disclosure
was "inadvertent," at least in the sense
that it was not an intentional or purposeful
disclosure. From this it follows that IDSC
did not disclose the documents for the purpose of gaining an advantage for itself, or,
put another way, for "offensive" purposes.
See AMCA International Corporation v.
Phipard, 107 F.R.D. 39, 43-44 (D.Mass.,
1985).1
DEC served the request for documents in
May, 1987. IDSC claims that the request
was very broad and necessitated a review
of 500,000 of IDSC's documents. The sorting, reviewing and copying of the requested documents was supervised by Attorney
Gary A. Cohen who was assisted by three
paralegals from his law firm2 and the entire staff of IDSC comprising thirteen employees. A week after receipt of the document request, IDSC moved its offices to
another location in Manchester, New
Hampshire; so far as appears, no review of
documents began until after the move to
the new location.
In the new location, a conference room
was set aside as a central area where documents could be reviewed and copied. The
three paralegals were instructed by Attorney Cohen as to the "parameters" of the
subject matter. See Standard Chartered Bank
PLC v. Ayala International Holdings, 111 F.R.D.
76, 85 (S.D.N.Y., 1986); Parkway Gallery v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.
D. 46, 53 (M.D.N.C., 1987).
2. The law firm which represented the plaintiff
at the time at which the document production
took place is not the same law firm which
presently represents the plaintiff.
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work product rule and the attorney-client
privilege and were instructed to "err on the
side of caution" in choosing documents
which should be withheld. Affidavit of Attorney Gary A. Cohen, Etc. (# 38) at 119.
The paralegals affixed different colored
"post-its" to documents which were to be
withheld or to documents about which they
had questions. When the documents were
copied, the "post-its" were affixed to the
copies which were then shipped to the office of Attorney Cohen's law firm in Boston. Pink "post-its" were affixed to documents which were to be withheld on
grounds of work product or attorney-client
privilege; yellow "post-its" were placed on
documents as to which the paralegals had
questions. Affidavit, Etc. (#38) at 1113.
By late August, 1987, copies of all relevant documents in IDSC's possession, both
privileged and unprivileged, had been assembled in the law firm's Boston office;
the documents totalled ninety cases. The
entire set of copies was then shipped to Sir
Speedy, a professional copying company, to
be Bates-stamped and duplicated in identical form. In September, the duplicate set
of copies was returned to the law firm's
office, with the documents bearing the
same labels as to what was privileged. Affidavit, Etc. (# 38) at 111118-19.
So far as I can glean from Attorney
Cohen's affidavit, no segregation of attorney-client or work product material was
made until after Sir Speedy had Batesstamped the copies which had been shipped
to the law firm and had then made a duplicate set of those documents. In other
words, it was only the pink or yellow "postits" on the copies which had been shipped
from Manchester to the law firm which
identified documents which would be withheld.
Attorney Cohen avers that the "last
phase of screening" for privileged documents took place under his supervision
and comprised two steps:
First, the complete document index prepared by the paralegals during the New
Hampshire phase was reviewed. This
review, together with an examination of
the boxes which were marked with
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"Post-it" stickers, confirmed that privileged documents were concentrated in
groups distributed throughout the ninety
cartons we were preparing to produce.
Next, the entire contents of every folder
identified by sticker as containing one or
more pages of privileged matter was
carefully reviewed again. As a result of
this two-part screening process, approximately 2,600 documents were withheld
on grounds of privilege.
Affidavit, Etc. (# 38) at II 20.
From this I gather that there was no
plenary review of all the documents to cull
out those which had pink or yellow "postits" on them. Instead, reliance was placed
on the "document index." However, there
is nothing in Attorney Cohen's affidavit
which indicates that the indices contained
any notations as to whether a document
was privileged or not; the only notation
which is mentioned is the affixing of the
pink or yellow "post-it" to the document
itself. Next, Attorney Cohen speaks of
examining "boxes" with "post-it" stickers
on them. This is the first mention of any
"post-it" stickers going on boxes in which
privileged documents were kept; the only
previous mention is of "post-its" being affixed to the documents themselves. Then
he avers that " . . . the entire contents of
every folder identified by sticker as containing one or more pages of privileged
matter was carefully reviewed again" [and]
"[a]s a result of this two-part screening
process, approximately 2,600 documents
were withheld on grounds of privilege."
The problem with this explanation is that
there is nothing in the affidavit to indicate
that "folders" were marked with "post-its"
if they contained privileged documents. As
I stated, the only marking as to privileged
documents which is mentioned in the affidavit is the placing of pink or yellow "postits" on the documents themselves, not on
"folders" or "boxes."
In sum, Attorney Cohen seems to have
relied on "post-its" put on "folders" and/or
"boxes" to determine whether or not any
privileged documents were contained in the
"folder" and/or "box." However, his affidavit contains no information as to how
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these "po&t-its" came to be applied to the
folders and/or boxes, by whom, and at
what stage of the process. In addition,
there is no description of how the privileged documents were removed from the
copies which Sir Speedy made and which
were to be turned over to DEC; presumably, these copies did not contain "post-its."
Perhaps the privileged documents were
culled from the original copies by "post-its"
and then the documents with the same
Bates numbers were culled from the copies
Sir Speedy made. I am not told.
What is clear is that DEC received twenty documents comprising eighty-eight
pages which were privileged and confidential. DEC represents that all of the documents came from one of the boxes, i.e.,
the box which was numbered 42. The
eighty-eight pages of documents have been
submitted to the Court as Exhibit C to the
Affidavit Of Robert Stillman (# 41).3 The
documents should have appeared to any
paralegal as being privileged. One document, comprising twenty-five pages, is a
transcript of an interview of IDSC's President conducted by Attorney Cohen himself;
several other documents are enclosures to
cover letters written on the law firm's stationery. There is also a thirty-two page
draft complaint in this action with commentary.
If the first step in the process was a
review of the document index prepared by
the paralegals, I do not see how these
documents could have been overlooked if
the description of the documents by the
paralegals was even close to the mark.
However, going on to step two, the most
likely explanation for the failure to cull out
these documents is that the pink or yellow
"post-it" which was on the "box" numbered
42 was either never put on the box, or was
mistakenly removed, or was overlooked.
This would seem to explain the fact that all
3. The Affidavit Of Robert Stillman (#41) and
attachments thereto have been impounded by
the Court pursuant to an agreement of counsel
for the parties.

attorney-client privilege for documents which
he is compelled to produce." 573 F.2d at 650-51
(emphasis in original). In the Standard Finanrial case, the Bankruptcy Judge determined that
there was no evidence that there was an attorney-client relationship at the time the communication was made, and, thus, no privilege attached to the communication. 77 B.R. at 330.

4. Neither of these courts had to decide the issue.
In the Transamerica case, the Ninth Circuit held
that there was no waiver because disclosure had
been compelled and "a party does not waive the
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the privileged documents which were produced were found in that box.
/
The law to be applied to the question as
to whether there has been a waiver of the
privilege by inadvertent disclosure is not
uniform, and there does not appear to be
any controlling First Circuit case on the
question. In Re Standard Financial
Management Corp., 77 B.R. 324, 330
(Bkrtcy, D.Mass., 1987); Transamerica
Computer Company, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 573 F.2d 646,
650 (9 Cir., 1978).4
In Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451 (S.D.
N.Y., 1955), the Court seems to hold that
inadvertent disclosure can never result in a
waiver because if the disclosure was inadvertent, there was no intention to waive the
privilege and that one cannot waive the
privilege without intending to do so. To
the same effect is Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas v. Marathon Oil Company, 109
F.R.D. 12, 21 (D.Neb., 1983) in which the
Court seems to indicate that an "inadvertent" disclosure would not operate as a
waiver of the privilege unless the "failure
to catch" a document prior to production of
a mass of documents was a "deliberate"
act or "the result of conscious but erroneous decision."
On the other hand, the Court in Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F.Supp. 546, 548-49 (D.D.C.,
1970), in response to a claim of inadvertent
disclosure, refused to look beyond the "objective fact" that the document was turned
over to opposing counsel as part of document production " . . . to determine whether the [partyj really intended to have the
document examined." The Court reasoned
that regardless of whether production was
"inadvertent" or not, the "confidentiality"
of the document was "breached" by the

disclosure, thereby destroying the basis
for the continued existence of the privilege." Id. at 549. Magistrate Dwyer
seems to follow the decision in Underwater
Storage in the case of Chubb Integrated
Systems v. National Bank of Washington,
103 F.R.D. 52, 66-68 (D.D.C., 1984).
Another line of cases follows a middle
ground whereby inadvertent disclosures
"may" or "may not" result in a waiver of
the privilege depending on whether or not
the party producing the documents * took
precautions to protect the privilege. This
doctrine seems to have originated in cases
in which it was claimed that the privilege
was waived when a party or attorney
placed the documents in a place where
third parties could view them. In Re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2 Cir., 1973), cert
denied, 414 U.S. 867, 94 S.Ct. 64, 38 L.Ed.
2d 86 (1973); In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4 Cir., 1984);
Suburban Sew N Sweep, Inc. v. SwissBemina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 258-60 (N.D.
111., 1981); O'Leary v. Purcell Co., Inc.,
108 F.R.D. 641, 644 (M.D.N.C, 1985).
Even though the doctrine does not seem
to have originated in cases in which the
disclosure was "inadvertent" during the
course of a production of documents in
litigation, it has been applied to this situation. Lois Sportswear, USA. v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.
N.Y., 1985); Parkway Gallery v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., supra, 116 F.R.D. at 50. (M.D.N.C, 1987);
Liggett Group v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205,207-08 (M.D.
N.C., 1986).
I do not find the application of this doctrine to "inadvertent" disclosure during
document production in litigation particularly useful. The reason is that the court
applying the doctrine to this situation
comes quite close to applying a per se rule
or something akin to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. Put another way, the opinions of the courts in these cases, after a
substantial amount of verbiage, can be reduced to a bottom line to the effect that the
precautions were inadequate because they
were not effective in preventing the disclo-
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sure of privileged documents. If the precautions had been adequate, the disclosure
would not have occurred. Frankly, I do
not see this result as a significant advance
in jurisprudence.
Accordingly, I see little benefit to making a judgment about the adequacy of the
plaintiffs precautions. I have indicated
where there were deficiencies, but I do not
think I am saying any more than that the
precautions were inadequate because they
were ineffective in preventing the disclosure.
In addition, I see little benefit to doing a
painstaking evaluation of the precautions
taken by plaintiffs counsel when it is noted
that the whole basis for the privilege is to
maintain the confidentiality of the document. It cannot be doubted that the confidentiality of the document has been destroyed by the "inadvertent" disclosure no
less than if the disclosure had been purposeful; it equally cannot be doubted that
the confidentiality of the communication
can never be restored, regardless of whether the disclosure was "inadvertent" or purposeful. In other words, regardless of how
painstaking the precautions, there is no
order I can enter which erases from defendant's counsel's knowledge what has
been disclosed. There is no order which
can remedy what has occurred, regardless
of whether or not the precautions were
sufficient.
Plaintiff suggests that a protective order
be issued prohibiting the defendant from
"using" the documents, a sort of "use immunity." I reject the suggestion because I
do not see what purpose would be served.
Such an order would not restore the confidential nature of the document The most
that can be said is that it would prohibit the
defendant's attorneys from using documents to which they were not entitled in
the first place. But as I see it, the only
reason that the defendant received the document in the first place is because the
precautions were insufficient.
In sum, I agree with the Court in the
case of Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Company, supra.
When confidentiality is lost through "inad-
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vertent" disclosure, the Court should not
look at the intention of the disclosing party.
314 F.Supp. at 549. It follows that the
Court should not examine the adequacy of
the precautions taken to avoid "inadvertent" disclosure either.
I also agree with the Bankruptcy Court
in the case of In Re Standard Financial
Management Corp., supra. Despite theoretical arguments to the contrary, "... in
the real world, unforced disclosure is disclosure and should support the waiver argument" 77 B.R. at 330. "[M]istake or
inadvertence is, after all, merely a euphemism for negligence, and, certainly . . . one is
expected to pay a price for one's negligence." Id.
In this latter vein, a strict rule that "inadvertent" disclosure results in a waiver of
the privilege would probably do more than
anything else to instill in attorneys the
need for effective precautions against such
disclosure.
Considering all the facts and circumstances, I rule that disclosure5 of documents protected by the attorney-client
privilege in the course of pre-trial discovery
in which documents are being produced
pursuant to Rule 34, F.R.Civ.P., operates
as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege
as to any documents disclosed by "inadvertence." I find that such a rule is most
consistent with the purposes of the privilege, and the interest of the administration
of justice generally.
For all these reasons, it is ORDERED
that International Digital Systems Corporation's Motion For Protective Order (#36)
be DENIED.

S. That is, disclosure which is not compelled.
See Transamerica Computer Company, Inc. v.

AVRAMIDIS v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO.
CIUM 120 FJLD. 450 (DJVUs*. 1988)

Dimitrios AVRAMIDIS, et ah, Plaintiff,
v.
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, et
al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 85-3972-WD.
United States District Court,
D. Massachusetts.
June 15, 1988.
Gasoline franchisees brought action
against former and current franchisors for
alleged violations of Petroleum Marketing
Practices Act. On plaintiffs motion to
compel discovery, the District Court, Joyce
London Alexander, United States Magistrate, held that: (1) relevant geographic
market for discovery purposes consisted of
all retail marketing districts which included
Massachusetts franchises, and (2) franchisor was required to specify, in sufficient
detail, records sought by franchisees, so
that franchisees could inspect and/or copy
records.
Ordered accordingly.
1. Federal Civil Procedure e=»1503
Relevant geographic market area, for
purpose of determining permissible scope
of interrogatories propounded by gasoline
franchisees in their Petroleum Marketing
Practices Act against franchisors, consisted
of all retail marketing districts containing
Massachusetts franchisees, in that action
involved only Massachusetts franchises.
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act,
§ 101(16), 15 U.S.C.A § 2801(16).
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»1534
Where defendant's business records
which were relevant to answering plaintiffs interrogatories were housed out of
state, and many file cabinets were used to
store those records, defendant was required to specify, in sufficient detail,
records sought by plaintiff, so that plaintiff
could then go to where records were stored
to inspect and/or copy them. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 33(c), 28 U.S.C.A.
International Business Machines Corp* supra,
573 F.2d at 650.
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Myles Jacobson, Marc A. Friedman,
Thompson, Thompson, Nagel & Jacobson,
Springfield, Mass., for plaintiff Vincent
Cuttone.

standard metropolitan statistical area as
periodically established by the Office of
Management and Budget." Defendant
contends that under this section, the ComWilliam G. Lowerre, Shell Oil Co. Legal monwealth of Massachusetts alone constiDept, Houston, Tex., and Stephen J. tutes the relevant geographic market in the
instant case, and thus plaintiff should be
Brake, Nutter, McClennan & Fish, Boston,
able to obtain the information he seeks as
Mass., for defendant Shell Oil Co.
it concerns only other franchisee-dealers
operating in Massachusetts. Plaintiff, on
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF VINCENT CUT- the other hand, contends that under the
TONE'S MOTION TO COMPEL AN- Act, the issue is whether Shell, as Atlantic
SWERS TO INTERROGATORIES BY Richfield's ("ARCO") successor franchisor,
offered a franchise to plaintiff which was
SHELL OIL COMPANY
discriminatory when compared to Shell's
JOYCE LONDON ALEXANDER,
existing franchises, and the question
United States Magistrate.
should be answered without geographical
Plaintiffs, gasoline franchisees, brought limitation. See Memorandum of Plaintiff
this action against defendants, former and in Support of Motion to Compel (# 190),
current franchisors, under the Petroleum 5, 8. Plaintiff, therefore, asserts that deMarketing Practices Act ("PMPA"). Plain- fendant's responses to plaintiffs interrogatories should not be limited to concern only
tiff Vincent Cuttone's instant motion to
franchisees in Massachusetts, but must
compel seeks responses to certain interrog- provide information within a national scope
atories, Numbers 1, 2, 8 and 10, propound- for Interrogatory Number l.1 For Intered to defendant Shell Oil Company. The rogatories Numbers 2 and 102, plaintiff
dispute here is twofold: 1) plaintiff and seeks information concerning dealers in the
defendant disagree as to the scope of the New England Retail Marketing District
relevant geographical market; and 2) plain- and the Hartford Retail Marketing District
tiff and defendant disagree as to who since Massachusetts dealers are split and
shoulders the responsibility, under Fed.R. included in either district There appears
Civ.P. 33(c), to inspect the many files con- to be no dispute that information concerntaining documents and identify those re- ing only Massachusetts dealers is all that is
called for in Interrogatory Number 8.3
sponsive to plaintiffs interrogatories.
RELEVANT GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET
[1] This Court finds that under
Under the PMPA, 15 U.S.C. § 2801(16), § 2801(16), the relevant geographic market
the term "relevant geographic market area consists of both the New England and
area" is defined as "including] a State or a the Hartford Retail Marketing Districts.
1. Interrogatory Number 1 states:
Identify all pending and concluded lawsuits in
which Shell Oil Co. (hereinafter "Shell") is a
defendant and in which a claim based on rent
charged to a franchisee is made.
2. Interrogatories Numbers 2 and 10 state:
Interrogatory Number 2: For the period from
January 1985 to date, state the total number
of service stations in the New England Retail
Marketing District and the Hartford Retail
Marketing District as to which an "adjustment'' to the VRP, contract rent or optimum
volume was made in accordance with the
procedure described in paragraph 13 of the
Affidavit of J. William Schutzenhofer, and
identify each station, giving its mailing address, the name of the adjustment, the period
covered by the franchise, and the reasons for
the adjustment.

Interrogatory Number 10: For every Shell station in the New England Retail Marketing
District and the Hartford Retail Marketing
District during the period from the begining
(sic) of the earliest period considered in setting the Plaintiffs contract rents to present,
state the following:
(a) The name and address of the station;
(b) the name of the franchisee;
(c) the Contract Rent;
(d) the number of gallons per month purchased;
(e) the threshold volume.
3. Interrogatory Number 8 states:
As to each plaintiffs station, identify the existing Shell dealers deemed to be similar facilities in the same area for purposes of initially
computing the Contract Rents initially speci-
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If you wish to remain a member of
ass, you need do nothing at this stage
e proceedings
If you wish to be excluded from the
you must submit a written request
xclusion For your convenience, the
st for exclusion may be submitted on
ttached form, entitled "Request for
ision " If you received this notice by
a Request for Exclusion form should
accompanied it If you did not rea Request for Exclusion form, you
obtain a copy by writing to the Clerk
>urt, P 0 Box
, Cincinnati, Ohio
L A written Request for Exclusion
be submitted without using the Refor Exclusion form, but it must refer
e litigation as Ronald J Thompson,
et al v Midwest Foundation Indeent Physicians Association d/b/a
ceCare, et al, No C-l-86-744, myour name and address, and the
» and address of your chosen counsel if
do not choose class counsel, in your
ment requesting exclusion Any ret for exclusion must be received on or
re October 23, 1987 by the clerk of the
2d States District Court for the SouthDistrict of Ohio at P 0 Box
, Cmiti, Ohio 45201
) The plaintiffs m this class action are
ssented by two firms which have been
oved as class counsel They are
Stanley M Chesley, Esq
TE, SCHNEIDER, BAYLESS &
CHESLEY CO, LP A
1513 Central Trust Tower
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
513-621-0267
James R Cummins, Esq
)WN, CUMMINS & BROWN CO.,
LPA
500 Carew Tower, 441 Vine Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
513-381-2121

13) The approved class representatives
in this class action are
John A Brunsman
11325 Springfield Pike
Cincinnati Ohio 45246

S George Lesinski
629 Oak St. Suite 201
Cincinnati Ohio 45206

Paul Grot*
7320-A Kingsgate Way
WestChester Ohio 45069

Richard T Marnell
3333 Vine Street
Cincinnati Ohio 45220

John J Jaeger
629 Oak Street
Cincinnati Ohio 45206

Ronald J Thompson
4452 Eastgate Boulevard
Cincinnati Ohio 45242

14) Examination of pleadings and papers This notice is not all inclusive References to pleadings and other papers and
proceedings are only summaries For full
details concerning the class action and the
claims and defenses which have been asserted by the parties, you or your counsel
may review the pleadings and other papers
filed at the office of the Clerk of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Room 324, U S P O & Courthouse, 100 East Fifth Street, Cincinnati,
Ohio 45202, on any business day from 9 00
AM to 500 P M
15) Interpretation of this Notice Except as indicated in the orders and decisions of the United States District Court
for the Southern Distnct of Ohio, Western
Division, no court has yet ruled on the
merits of any of the claims or defenses
asserted by the parties in this class action
This notice is not an expression of an opinion by the Court as to the merits of any
claims or defenses This notice is being
sent to you solely to inform you of the
nature of the litigation, your rights and
obligations as a class member, the steps
required to be excluded from the class, the
Court's certification of the class, and the
forthcoming trial
Daniel J Lyons, Jr
Deputy Clerk
United States District Court for
the Southern Distnct of Ohio,
Western Division
Dated.

EXCLUSION REQUEST FORM
Clerk
United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio Western Division
PO Box
Cincinnati Ohio 45201
Re Ronald J Thompson M D et al
v
Midwest Foundation Independent
Physicians Association d/b/a
ChoiceCare, et al
No C-1-8&-744
I hereby request to be excluded from the class action
in the above captioned matter

(Signature)
Name (Print)
Address

Name of Chosen Counsel
Address

CO
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BAXTER TRAVENOL LABORATORIES, INC., Robert P Popovich,
and Jack W. Moncnef, Plaintiffs,
v.
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, Defendant
No. 84 C 5103.
United States Distnct Court,
N D Illinois, E D
May 26, 1987
On Reconsideration July 22, 1987
Patent action was brought Plaintiffs
moved for return of document they claimed
was pnvileged and was inadvertently produced The Distnct Court, Elaine E Bucklo, United States Magistrate, held that attorney-chent pnvilege was waived by plaintiffs' failure to claim pnvilege for several
months after inadvertent production of document, in face of defendant's repeated use

1. Federal Civil Procedure <&=»1600.4
Plaintiffs' failure to claim attorneyclient privilege for months after they knew
that document had been produced waived
privilege, if document was ever privileged
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»1600.1
Plaintiffs' vague statements about circumstances of conversation coupled with
poor memory as to alleged pnvileged nature of document to begin with were simply insufficient to sustain plaintiffs' belated claim of attorney client privilege with
respect to document
On Reconsideration
3. Federal Civil Procedure «=»1600.4
Inadvertent production of otherwise
privileged documents did not waive pnvilege as to those documents, under protective order
4. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1600.4
Delay in claiming attorney-client pnvilege can result m waiver, even where initial
production of allegedly pnvileged document may have been inadvertent, it may
be unfair and unrealistic to uphold the pnv
liege, where documents have been examined and used by opposing party pnor to
assertion of pnvilege
5. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1600.4
Plaintiffs waived attorney-client pnvilege in inadvertently produced document
by failing to assert pnvilege for several
months in face of defendant's repeated use
of and reliance on document

Granger Cook, Jr, Gary W McFarron,
Cook, Wetzel & Egan, Ltd, Chicago, 111,
for plaintiffs
D Dennis Allegretti, Timothy J Malloy,
Paul H Berghoff, Allegretti, Newitt, Witcoff and McAndrews, Chicago, 111, for defendant
ORDER
United States
BUCKLO,
ELAINE E
Magistrate
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inadvertently produced.
The parties
agreed at the start of this litigation that
inadvertent production of privileged documents would not waive any privilege. Defendant says, however, that this document
has not been shown to be privileged, and
that if it is, plaintiff did not inadvertently
produce it. The document consists of some
handwritten notes by Dr. Popovich, a plaintiff who is one of the inventors of the
patents in issue. Defendant was allowed
to inspect the notes and requested a copy
of the document in August, 1986. Defendant represents that it was told that plaintiffs' counsel had reviewed the documents
for privileged material prior to production.
Thereafter, defendant, taking note of the
fact that Popovich makes the statement in
the document that "Oreopouli (sic) invented
this," referring to part of what plaintiffs
are claiming as their own invention, quoted
from and attached the document in various
motions filed with the court in September,
October and November, 1986. It is not
denied that Popovich saw these motions
and he was surely aware of the potential
importance of the document as a very damaging admission.
Popovich says, however, that while he
ivas aware of the fact that the document
ted been produced, he did not remember
Jiat the document consisted of notes of a
£lephone conversation he had with his at»rney until he was preparing for his deposition. He says he then remembered what
,he notes were because the original doclment had his attorney's telephone number
>n it (If so, that document has not been
)roduced to the court The document that
have seen does not have a telephone
lumber on it)
Despite the fact that Popovich says that
le belatedly remembered that the dociment in question was privileged on the
ve of his deposition, when questioned
tbout it at his deposition, he did not claim
>rivilege.
[1] It seems clear that if the document
n question was ever privileged, plaintiffs
waived their privilege at some point in time
ifter its production. Inadvertent means
iccidental. Once Popovich knew the doc-

ument had been produced it was incumbent
on him to say something. When he failed
to do anything over a period of months, its
continued production can no longer be
deemed inadvertent Furthermore, Popovich admits that in preparation for his deposition he determined the document was
privileged. Yet he failed to raise any claim
of privilege at the deposition. I conclude
that if the document was ever privileged,
the privilege was waived by Popovich's failure to claim privilege for months after he
knew that the document had been produced.
[2] I also find that Popovich has failed
to sustain his claim of privilege. The attorney-client privilege is an exception to the
rule that all relevant evidence should be
disclosed in an adversary proceeding. As
such, the courts repeatedly have warned
that the privilege must be narrowly construed. One seeking to rely on it bears the
burden of proving that a document is in
fact privileged. In this case, there is nothing in the document itself to indicate any
privilege. Popovich says that he does not
know when the allegedly privileged conversation took place. He did not remember
that the notes were even of such a conversation until months after he was aware of
the production of the document.
Popovich, the person claiming the privilege, has the burden of proving privilege.
In this case, Popovich's vague statements
about the circumstances of the conversation coupled with his poor memory as to
the alleged privileged nature of the document to begin with, are simply insufficient to sustain his belated claim of privilege.
ON RECONSIDERATION
Baxter moves for reconsideration of this
court's order of May 26, 1987 denying Baxter's motion to compel the return of a privileged document Baxter produced the document to Abbott in August 1986, assertedly inadvertently. The court denied Baxter's motion on the grounds that Baxter
had waived any privilege it had in the document In finding waiver, the court noted
that Abbott had quoted the document in or

privilege prior to disclosure, but under the
circumstances its initial production of the
document may have been inadvertent. Cf
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc., supra, 104
F.R.D. at 105 (where privilege is claimed as
to only 22 documents out of 16,000 pages
inspected and 3,000 pages requested to be
produced, disclosure was inadvertent).
However, upon Abbott's request, Baxter
[3] The last factor relied on was incorrect Transcripts show that at the deposi- produced a copy of the document without
tion, Popovich's attorney did assert that the objection in September, 1986, and Abbott
document was privileged. This does not, thereafter quoted from the document and
however, change the outcome of Baxter's attached copies of it to its memoranda in
motion. Under the protective order, inad- September, October, and November. Popovertent production of otherwise privileged vich was aware that the document had
documents does not waive the privilege as been produced, and of its potential importo those documents. Baxter asserts that tance, by September, 1986. By failing to
its production of the document was inad- assert the privilege until mid-December, in
vertent. The cases discussing whether pro- the face of Abbott's repeated use of and
duction was inadvertent consider such reliance on the document, Baxter waived
factors as the scope and volume of dis- any privilege it had in the document.
covery, the time available for review of the
Popovich has established that the docdocuments by the party asserting the privi- ument was privileged. McLemore's Suplege, the adequacy of the party's proce- plemental Affidavit provides a reasonably
dures for review, the time taken to rectify precise date for the conversation, and also
the error, and the overreaching issue of identifies the subject matter sufficiently
fairness and protection of the privilege. that it appears the conversation involved
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Gavey, 109 the request for or provision of legal advice.
F.R.D. 323, 330-31 (N.D.Cal.1985); Lois However, the privilege was waived by PoSportwear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & povich's failure to claim the privilege until
Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y.1985). mid-December, 1986.
[4] Even where the initial production
may have been inadvertent, however, delay
s* w v
in claiming the privilege can result in waiv(O IKEY NUMSEt SYSTEM >
er. Where prior to the assertion of the
privilege, the documents have been examined and used by the opposing party, it may
be unfair and unrealistic to uphold the privilege. In re Grand Jury Investigation of
Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d 672, 674Renard TAYLOR, Plaintiff,
75 (D.C.Cir.), cert denied sub nom, Seav.
Land Service, Inc. v. United States, 444
Bruce
WAGNER,
Defendant
U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct 229, 62 L.Ed.2d 169
(1979).
No. 87 C 422.
[5] Under these standards, Baxter's
United States District Court,
privilege was waived although it was asN.D. Illinois, E.D.
serted at the time of the deposition. The
Sept 18, 1987.
document Baxter claims is privileged was
one document of among eight boxes of
documents produced by Baxter for inspecApplication was brought for Rule 11
tion in August. Baxter has not explained
its procedures for reviewing documents for sanctions. The District Court, Bua, J., held

attached it to legal memoranda submitted
to the court in September, October, and
November without objection by Baxter, and
that at his deposition, Popovich, who made
the document, had not claimed the privilege, although he claimed to have determined that the document was privileged
prior to his deposition.

